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ABSTRACT
Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each house of Congress keep a Journal of its
proceedings. Contemporary observers have largely ignored this provision, treating it as a vestigial record-keeping
requirement with little significance for modern law. This dismissive attitude is misguided. Historically, legislative
Journals were one of the primary mechanisms by which Parliament, and later Congress, made and interpreted
constitutional law. Journals are the official histories of legislatures’ activity. They record what legislatures do as
institutions—what powers they exercise, what procedures they use, and what actions by the coordinate branches
they protest or resist. In systems in which many aspects of legislative power are not reviewable by outside courts,
the historical record of a legislature’s actions, and of actions by other governmental actors which they accept as
legitimate, are critical sources of legal precedent. By keeping Journals, early Anglo-American legislatures learned
to strategically manage this precedent in order to negotiate the contours of sovereign power with other governmental
bodies. In the mid-nineteenth century, this practice largely disappeared as legislatures turned their attention to
newer forms of record keeping, such as transcripts of floor debates, which were designed to accommodate the policy
agendas of partisan interest groups. The institutional practices that evolved to enable legislatures to express
collective judgments on questions of constitutional law through Journal-keeping atrophied. As a result, by the
twentieth century legislatures were largely considered to be incapable of the kinds of sophisticated legal analysis
employed by courts and the Executive. This assumption, which is now pervasive, has generated pessimism about
Congress’s ability to engage in sustained, rational discourse on important questions of structural constitutionalism.
The forgotten history of Journals and the Journal Clause demonstrates that legal reasoning by legislatures is not
only possible in theory but was exercised in practice for centuries with a great degree of sophistication.
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INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each
house of Congress “keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require
secrecy.”1 This mandate that Congress keep and publish records of its official
acts—the “Journal Clause”—has been largely ignored by the legal
community. No court has ever given it an authoritative interpretation, nor
has any scholar written a definitive account of its origins or purpose.2 This
neglect is unfortunate, because the tradition of journal-keeping that the
clause codifies was once a core source of constitutional construction in AngloAmerican law.
The few scholars who have mentioned the Journal Clause in passing have
mostly understood it as a prototype of modern legislative practices. In
standard accounts of congressional procedure, for instance, the Journal
Clause is usually written off as an antique form of legislative history—a
“skeletal procedural record” with pre-modern origins, whose usefulness in
deciphering congressional intent has been superseded by other, more
voluminous paper records such as committee reports and the Congressional
Record.3 Other commentators, looking for constitutional predicates to
modern concepts of government transparency, have suggested that the
Journal Clause was intended to serve an information-producing function.4
1
2
3
4

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6:4 (2d ed.
2018) (noting that the Journal Clause “has been the subject of very little judicial construction”).
Nicholas Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary,
and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L. J. 266, 271 (2013).
See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 744 n.155 (2012) (citing the
Journal Clause as evidence of a requirement that legislative proceedings be mostly open to the
public); Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the
Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 281 (2003) (describing
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Adrian Vermeule has argued that “[m]any participants [in the
Constitutional Convention] desired to constitutionalize some version of a
requirement that Congress publicize its deliberations and votes,” and that
“[a]lthough the framers realized that transparency might distort deliberation
. . . many delegates believed that future legislators could not be trusted to
weigh the costs and benefits of transparency in public-regarding fashion.”5
David Pozen likewise argues that the Journal Clause “contemplates
legislative secrecy,” in its allowance that Congress may in its discretion keep
proceedings secret, “but only as a deviation from a norm of publicity; the
Constitution’s sole grant of a secrecy power is coupled to an anterior duty of
disclosure.”6 These observers find the Journal Clause unremarkable. They
see it as an early mechanism for forcing democratic accountability, worth
noting as a matter of precedent, but no longer relevant in any practical sense.
These accounts are misguided. Because they view the Journal Clause
through the lens of twentieth and twenty-first century legal concerns, modern
commentators miss its true significance. The Journals of the House and the
Senate, and of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in the British
Parliament, are not intended to facilitate transparency. Indeed, from their
origins in late medieval England until the beginning of the nineteenth
century, legislative Journals existed alongside highly restrictive regimes of
legislative secrecy, under which both British and American legislatures
forbade the public from observing or publishing accounts of their debates.
Nor were legislative Journals intended to serve as tools of statutory
interpretation. They predate the modern concept of legislative history by
several centuries.7
Rather, the Journals are law-producing documents, and a critical
medium through which Parliament and later Congress historically engaged
in constitutional interpretation. When Parliament began keeping official
records of its proceedings in the thirteenth century, their purpose was to
establish an institutional identity for the nascent legislature. They performed
this task in two ways: (1) by establishing precedents for the internal rules and
procedures by which Parliament operated, and (2) by memorializing
agreements with the Crown over the limits of parliamentary authority. The

5
6
7

the Journal Clause as a constitutional requirement that Congress make information public);
Shannon E. Martin & Gerry Lanosga, The Historical and Legal Underpinnings of Access to Public
Documents, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 613, 614 (2010) (citing the Journal Clause to state that the Constitution
“clearly indicates that the actions of Congress shall be recorded and made public”); Barry Sullivan,
FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L.
REV. 1, 62 (2012) (categorizing the Journal Clause as a structural aspect of the Constitution that
protects liberty).
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 372 (2004).
David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 293 (2010).
See Parrillo, supra note 3, at 272–74 (describing the growing use of legislative history by courts from
the mid-nineteenth century onward).
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intended audience for parliamentary Journals was not the public at large, but
rather the Crown and future Parliaments. Together, these functions formed
the basis for a significant portion of English constitutional law. The first
function—establishing how Parliament functioned, and what the rights and
obligations of the body and its members were—laid the groundwork for what
later became known as the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti (“lex Parliamenti”), a body
of law that developed concurrently with English common law and that
governed the operation of the legislature.8 The second function—
negotiating the boundaries of parliamentary power—formed the basis for the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that was established following the
political conflicts of the seventeenth century.9 From early in their history,
parliamentary Journals were considered by English law to constitute
precedent-making acts of state. By the seventeenth century, texts and
treatises on the law of Parliament cited the Journals of the House of Lords
and Commons as the authoritative source of law on the resolution of many
constitutional disputes.10
The legal importance of the English Journals reached its pinnacle during
the seventeenth century. The successive upheavals of the English Civil War,
the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution laid the foundation for the
sovereignty of Parliament in British law. Parliament, however, understood
its victory over absolute monarchy not as the defeat of Britain’s existing
political order, but as the defense of ancient liberties against royal excesses.
The seventeenth century saw a revival of interest in ancient legal sources by
Parliamentarians eager to root their political gains in a constitutional
tradition.11 Consistent with this renewed focus on precedent, Parliament
expanded and innovated on its Journal-keeping practices as never before.
Committees were established to explore and report on the contents of the
Journals to resolve constitutional disputes. Controversial acts of Parliament
were expunged by resolution, voiding their precedential effect. The House
of Lords began permitting members to enter formal dissents to legislative acts
on its Journals. All of this represented a new understanding that the content
of Parliament’s records—the practices and legislative privileges asserted
there and the powers over taxation and military affairs to which previous
monarchs had formally consented—played a critical role in determining the
contours of sovereign power and allowed those who held political authority
to legitimize their position by pointing to a legal and historical tradition of

8
9
10
11

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C. For a general discussion of the use of historical texts by parliamentary
advocates in the seventeenth century, see JANELLE GREENBERG, THE RADICAL FACE OF THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION (2001).
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consensual gains. By managing its records, Parliament was, in effect,
interpreting and creating constitutional law.
This tradition of resolving constitutional disputes—particularly disputes
between the legislative and the executive power—by reference to legislative
records was well known to the American colonies. Parliamentary traditions
strongly influenced colonial legislatures, and every assembly kept Journals in
the British tradition.12 On the eve of American independence, colonial
lawyers and politicians were as familiar with the practice of creating and
interpreting legislative precedent as they were with common law precedent.
The Journal Clause thus codified a practice that had become integral to
Anglo-American constitutionalism by the late eighteenth century. The
Journals played a primary role in delineating the powers and obligations of
the legislature and differentiating it from other departments of government.
Historians have observed that the boundaries between the coordinate
branches were not clearly defined in the early American republic.13
Legislatures engaged in a variety of practices, such as resolving cases and
controversies between citizens and administering public benefits, that would
appear foreign to twenty-first century constitutionalists.14 Disputes with the
executive were common.15 Indeed, as scholars of “departmentalism” have
noted, not only were the powers of different government actors unclear in
the early republic, so too was the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution
itself.16 Incidences of the early Executive branch administering policy
according to its own interpretation of the Constitution have been well
documented.17 But the Journals provided a vehicle for the legislature to
engage in constitutional interpretation as well. As they had in Britain, the
American Journals recorded Congress’s resolution of disputes over rules,
privileges, and procedures. They also recorded Congress’s decision to
exercise, or not to exercise, jurisdiction over certain government powers. In
short, they formed a historical foundation for the institutional identity of
Congress, as they had for the British Parliament.

12
13

14
15
16
17

See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755 (1996) (“[A]
genuine reconstruction of the Founding belies the contention that the Founders either always or
primarily viewed the doctrine of separation of powers in modern formalist terms.”).
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
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In a tripartite system of government in which many of Congress’s
procedures and obligations were exempted from judicial review or executive
control,18 the Journals’ role in developing that identity assumed
constitutional significance. Legislative records established precedent on
separation-of-powers questions in a way that judicial interpretation of the
Constitution alone could not. In times of political crisis, the Journals also
served as a medium for debating constitutional norms. This was particularly
so in the 1830s, when rising tensions over slavery and the combative policies
of the Jackson presidency combined to generate a series of constitutional
crises. In several high-profile disputes—including a showdown between
Jackson and the Senate over the President’s decision to defund the Second
Bank of the United States and controversies in both houses of Congress over
the right of citizens to petition for the abolition of slavery—Congress’s
Journals, rather than the records of any judicial court, served as the primary
medium of legal discourse. Legislators revived ancient parliamentary
practices such as expurgation in order to record their judgments on the
Journals of Congress, often invoking the historical role that legislative records
had played in constitutional construction.19
The Journals declined in political importance beginning in the 1840s.
There were no longer highly-publicized disputes over their contents, as there
had been in previous decades. But this was not, as some scholars have
suggested, because the Journals were superseded by newer legislative records
that performed their intended functions more effectively. New documents—
in particular, the transcripts of legislative debate that were ultimately
formalized as the Congressional Record—did replace the Journals.20 But the
intended purpose of these records was radically different. Beginning in the
late 1700s, the centuries-long tradition of legislative secrecy in Britain and
America was rapidly reversed. Legislative debates, long held behind closed
doors, were opened to the public and, more importantly, the press.
Transcripts of these debates—quickly compiled and widely distributed—
became the ideal legislative record for the era of mass politics and mass
communication. While the transcripts were a boon for democratic
accountability, however, their rise in prominence diminished the traditional
role of legislative Journals. The transcripts were fundamentally political
documents; they allowed individual legislators to communicate (through
floor speeches) their positions on specific political issues to their constituents
and their parties with unprecedented rapidity. The Journals, by contrast,
were legal documents. They provided the legislature with a medium for

18

19
20

See, e.g., James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable
Rules that Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40
BUFF. L. REV. 645, 645–47 (1992) (describing the non-justiciability of constitutional determinations
assigned to Congress by Article I).
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Part III.
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debating constitutional norms, both within the confines of its own chambers
and with the other branches of government. They recorded the judgment of
the institution as a whole on a legal issue, rather than the various positions of
its constituent members. The importance of these law-producing and lawinterpreting functions was lost as the attention of the public and the legal
community shifted to newer forms of record-keeping. As legislators were
incentivized to tailor their on-record statements more toward regional or
party constituencies, the older institutional dimension of their record-making
receded.
The effect of this change in record-keeping practice has been significant
but underappreciated by contemporary historians and legal scholars. Many
of the structural constitutional issues that the Journals evolved to adjudicate
continue to evade formal judicial resolution, either because they are
considered “political questions”21 committed to the legislature by the
constitutional text or because they depend on norms22 of governmental
behavior that courts lack the competency to adjudicate. These include
consequential questions of legislative procedure and inter-branch relations.23
But while Congress remains primarily responsible for resolving these
disputes, modern observers no longer consider it capable of adjudicating
them through the reasoned application of legal principles. Rather, it is
perceived to be uniquely (and perhaps exclusively) governed by the political

21

22

23

See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (defining the political question
doctrine in the context of deciding whether the claim before the Court was justiciable); Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (same); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (same); see also Louis
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 44143
(2004) (describing the Supreme Court’s historical efforts to avoid imposing legal rules on political
decision-making). But see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 237 (2002) (arguing that the
political questions doctrine has declined in importance in recent jurisprudence).
Josh Chafetz, in a compelling discussion of some underused aspects of Congress’s constitutional
authority, has written that the Constitution “leaves . . . the resolution” of “substantive issues” in
structural constitutional law, as well as “the resolution of the meta-question as to the proper site of
resolution for those issues,” to “constitutional politics.” Chafetz, supra note 4, at 721–22 (emphasis
and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1113 (2011) (book review)). The “space for conflict” created by
“interbranch tension” produces an incentive for the Congress and the Executive to “compete
publicly for the affections of the people” in a manner that “promotes healthy deliberation as to the
public good” and requires each branch to “make its case in the public sphere.” Id. at 722. David
Pozen has drawn on doctrines from other areas of law, such as self-help and bath faith, to examine
these questions. See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885 (2016); David
E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L. J. 2 (2014) [hereinafter Pozen, Self-Help].
The literature on inter-branch relations, and on the difficulty of resolving constitutional disputes
between the political branches non-judicially, is immense. For two particularly insightful recent
examinations of these issues, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006) and Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22.
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incentives of its constituent members.24 The courts, even in times of partisan
conflict over the judiciary, are still widely treated as capable of applying
content-neutral principles to the resolution of disputes.25 The Executive, too,
through mediums such as Office of Legal Counsel memoranda and
presidential veto and signing statements, can express coherent
interpretations of constitutional law.26 While these interpretations may have
partisan motivations, they are still legal, rather than political, in character.
They present a formal analysis that is susceptible to critique and revision.
The failure of Congress to provide any similar accounting for its institutional
behavior—to rationalize, by reference to democratic principles or
constitutional mandates, why it asserts or refrains from asserting certain
powers, or why it applies particular rules of internal procedure—has created
a legal vacuum in areas where reasoned discourse is badly needed. Observers
have worried that Congress’s substitution of partisan incentives for
institutional ones has a destabilizing effect on democratic politics and leads
to an escalating cycle of constitutional brinksmanship.27
Although many lament the degradation of legal discourse within the
political branches, there has been a noticeable failure to trace the root
institutional causes of this dysfunction. Lawyers and political scientists often
treat the atomized, political behavior of Congress as an inherent feature of
large elected bodies.28 The history of the Journal Clause provides a muchneeded corrective to this assumption. The causes of our modern democratic
pathologies are undeniably complex, and no single historical development
can fully explain them. But as scholars of administrative law have long
recognized, record-keeping requirements are accountability mechanisms
24
25

26

27
28

See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 640 (1995) (describing this
attitude among twentieth century theorists).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010) (describing the role that institutional
constraints and legal reasoning play in assisting judges to decide novel cases and structuring judicial
discretion); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010)
(demonstrating how judges have historically rendered decisions that accommodate political
realities, while still conforming to rule-bound methods of decision-making).
For an overview of contemporary debates concerning the interpretive role of the Office of Legal
Counsel, see, for example, Sonia Mittal, OLC’s Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the Office of Legal
Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2015); Rachel Ward Saltzman, Comment, Executive Power
and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 439 (2010). For an overview of presidential
interpretations of the Constitution through signing statements and other mechanisms, see Henry
L. Chambers, Jr., Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Signing Statements, Executive Power, and
Zivotofsky, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1183 (2016).
See infra Part IV.
The most influential expression of this idea has been in the field of political economy known as
“public choice theory,” which holds that the legislative process is often co-opted by well-organized
special interest groups who manipulate it for private gain. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility
Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 180 (1996)
(describing this theory). While it is most often used to critique legislation in specific areas of public
policy, it has also been employed to question the ability of the legislature to reason coherently within
a system of second-order institutional rules. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 24, at 644.
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that have an important effect on institutional behavior.29 By determining
what categories of information institutions are required to record, and what
audiences those records are presented to, societies mandate that institutions
prioritize certain values and perspectives over others. Records help structure
the way in which institutions reason. The seismic shift in record-keeping
procedure within Anglo-American legislatures between the late-eighteenth
and mid-nineteenth century—in which Congress, Parliament, and other
elective bodies transitioned rapidly from regimes of extreme secrecy to
extreme transparency; in which they began producing tens of thousands of
pages of transcripts targeted at emergent voting constituencies and political
parties; and in which they concurrently discarded the once-central practice
of strategically managing and interpreting precedential official histories—has
remained little studied. This shift dramatically changed the types of
reasoning in which American society incentivized its national legislature to
engage. As the legal community reckons with the consequences of
unreasoned combat over questions of structural constitutionalism, it is worth
remembering that deliberate choices in institutional design facilitated and
normalized this behavior.
This Article aims to recover the lost history of legislative constitutionalism
contained in the Journals of Parliament and Congress, and to explore its
relevance to contemporary law. Part I recounts the origins of legislative
Journal-keeping in England, from its beginnings in the late Middle Ages to
its rise to constitutional prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Part II describes the development of legislative Journal-keeping in
America, from the colonial period, through the drafting of the Journal
Clause, to the important record-keeping debates of the 1830s. Part III
describes the rise of the transcripts of debate in the early nineteenth century
and their eventual displacement of the Journals as the preeminent records of
legislative activity. Part IV situates the Journals within a theoretical legal
framework and describes their relevance to modern constitutionalism.

29

See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 101–03, 116–18 (2007) (noting among similarities
between American and European governing that “reason giving is fundamental to the moral and
political legitimacy of [their] legal orders”).
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I. LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION
A. The Early Origins of Legislative Journals
The Journals of the House of Commons and the House of Lords are the
authoritative records of official activity in each house of Parliament. They
evolved from the legislature’s earlier official records, the Rotuli Parliamentorum
or “Rolls of Parliament,” which in turn consolidated a disparate body of legal
documents and informal accounts of the convocations of Parliaments that
began to emerge in the early twelfth century.30 The Journals are the
authoritative record of Parliament’s proceedings, a status that was formalized
by statute in the sixteenth century, and has been continuously reaffirmed by
legal authorities since.31 Unlike statute books, the Journals’ primary purpose
is not to record the positive law enacted by Parliament. Rather, they record
the means by which Parliament governs itself: the votes it takes, the
resolutions it adopts, the rules it amends, and the external documents of
which it takes cognizance.32 Every volume of the Journals represents the
official institutional history of a parliamentary sitting, compiled by the clerk
and unanimously approved by a vote of the members of each house.
Parliament’s records played a critical role in establishing Parliament’s
institutional identity, and in defining its relationship to the other organs of
English government. When the Crown began to call, or “convoke,”
Parliaments in the thirteenth century, they did not have a permanent
administrative structure, a defined jurisdiction or legal purpose, or an
agreed-upon collection of legal powers.33 They were convened sporadically
and often reluctantly because, pursuant to the terms of the Magna Carta, the
monarch required the assent of the country’s nobility, as well as
representatives of the counties, in order to levy taxes.34 At their beginning,
they were no more than “afforced” or enlarged versions of the king’s advisory
council of powerful nobles, clerics and ministerial advisers, and were known
in the early thirteenth century as “great councils.”35 These councils began
to meet with greater frequency during the reign of Henry III, as a result of
his need to finance wars in France, and began to be called ‘Parliaments’ in
the middle of the thirteenth century.36 As the Crown’s financial needs

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

1 The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275–1504: Edward I, 1275–1294, at 1 (Paul Brand,
ed., 2005) [hereinafter Parliament Rolls].
Id.
Id. at § A(ii).
See G.O. Sayles, The Functions of the Medieval Parliament of England 12 (1988).
See id.
See id. (explaining the origins of more expansive king’s advisory councils).
See J.R. MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924–1327, at 166–77 (2010)
(explaining the origin of the term “parliament”).
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increased, Parliament leveraged its control of the money supply to secure a
larger and more stable role in governance, emerging as a more permanent
institution in the early fourteenth century.37 Through its size and the
geographic reach of its membership, it was also able to provide useful
administrative support to the early modern state. By the end of the thirteenth
century, Parliament had evolved to serve a dual role in English government.
On one hand, it served as counsel to the King, acting as a court to assist in
the administration of justice and advising on increasingly complex matters of
public policy.38 On the other hand, it also acted as a locus of resistance to
perceived abuses and misgovernment, using its power to withhold taxes as a
means of curtailing monarchial excess.39 This dynamic persisted throughout
the late Medieval and early modern period as Parliament’s jurisdiction
expanded, its membership expanded, and the complexity of its internal
management increased.
Parliament began keeping written records of its proceedings in the middle
of the thirteenth century.40 These early documents appear to have focused
on criticism of crown policy, and may have specified conditions attached to
Parliament’s assent to new taxes.41 The Oxford Parliament of 1258,
convened pursuant to an agreement with Henry III in exchange for a grant
of supply for an invasion of Sicily, was larger and more sophisticated than
previous meetings, and may have kept official records, though none have
survived.42 The first extant Rolls of Parliament date from the reign of
Edward I in the 1270s.43 From that time forward, the main business of
Parliament was consolidated into the parchment rolls, which constituted the
“master record” of the burgeoning institution.44 The Rolls were compiled
and arranged by the clerk of Parliament, a position appointed by the Crown
from among the clerks of chancery, but which owed loyalty neither to the
monarch nor to the legislature.45 Medieval Parliaments did not maintain
their own archives. Once the contents of the Rolls were finalized, they were

37
38
39

40

41
42
43
44
45

See id. at 338–40, 352.
See, e.g., id. at 177–80 (describing the growth of Parliament’s role in advising the crown).
See id. at 173–75 (describing the use of Parliament’s power over taxation to influence royal policy);
id. at 300–10 (same); see also id. at 218–26, 353–55 (describing role of Parliaments in resisting royal
abuses and advocating for local issues).
Id. at 181; see also 1 MATTHEW PARIS, MATTHEW PARIS’S ENGLISH HISTORY FROM THE YEAR
1235 TO 1278, at 398–400 (John Allen Giles trans., London, George Bell & Sons 1889) (recounting
a hostile exchange between barons and Henry III being recorded); 2 MATTHEW PARIS, MATTHEW
PARIS’S ENGLISH HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 1235 TO 1278, at 79 (John Allen Giles trans.,
London, Henry G. Bohn 1853) (recounting the creation of a council with recorded determinations).
MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 181.
MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 246–47.
Paul Brand, Introduction to 1 PARLIAMENT ROLLS, supra note 30, at § A(ii).
G.R. Elton, The Rolls of Parliament: 1449–1547, 22 HIST. J. 1, 1 (1979).
See A.F. Pollard, The Clerical Organization of Parliament, 57 ENG. HIST. REV. 31, 34 (1942) (explaining
the process by which clerks of Parliament were appointed).
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deposited with the Master of the Rolls, a Crown archivist, and stored with
the records of the courts of chancery in Chancery Lane.46
For the first several decades of their existence, the content and
composition of the Rolls is inconsistent.47 However, in 1341, a regularized
format emerged which persisted until they were displaced by the Journals as
official records in the early sixteenth century.48 The Rolls recorded four
primary items of business in a parliamentary session: (1) the opening
“charge” or speech, and the opening sermon when one occurred; (2) the
appointment by Parliament of the members of a sub-committee to receive
and adjudicate private petitions; (3) grants of taxation; and (4) petitions
submitted collectively by the Commons to the Crown, along with the
Crown’s answers.49 Memoranda recounting important legal cases and other
acts of government were also occasionally included.50 In addition,
explanatory text linking the various agenda items increased, such that the
Rolls were now “written up in the form of a discursive narrative” that would
be legible to readers from future Parliaments and elsewhere in government.51
By the fifteenth century, the Rolls also recorded the procedures by which
legislative bills (which had emerged from the Commons’ petition as a distinct
instrument of legislative procedure) were introduced and debated.52 This
evolution in composition coincided with Parliament’s increased role in
governance following the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War: as the
Crown’s request for taxation increased, Parliament’s role in supervising royal
expenditures grew, and its requests for royal concessions in exchange for
grants of supply proliferated.53
The Rolls, and later the Journals, were critical to facilitating the
development of both (1) the legislature’s administrative capacities and (2) its
role as the primary check on the royal prerogative. With respect to its
administrative capacities, the first and most important function of the early
Rolls was to record (“enroll”) Parliament’s receipt and adjudication of
petitions, or requests for a redress of grievances by private citizens.54
Petitions were a common method of seeking relief from royal courts, but
46
47
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51
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53
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Elton, supra note 44, at 12.
Brand, supra note 43, at 3; see also W.M. Ormrod, On—and Off—the Record: The Rolls of Parliament,
1337–1377, 23 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 39, 40 (2004) (noting that “[t]here was little in the way of
narrative text linking the various elements of business listed in the rolls, and little sense of a
chronological arrangement: the early rolls read very much as memoranda compiled as a means of
cross-referencing with other chancery series recording actions taken upon private and public
business completed in parliament”).
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 39–40.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40.
Elton, supra note 44, at 4, 17.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40 (footnote omitted).
MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 298–99.
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beginning in the 1270s, under the reign of Edward I, these requests began to
be submitted to Parliament in very large numbers.55 Throughout the Middle
Ages, petitioning constituted the overwhelming majority of Parliament’s
governmental work.56 The handling of petitions was both a judicial function
(in that it required Parliament to resolve individual, fact-specific complaints)
and an administrative function (in that it represented the bulk of Parliament’s
activity, and allowed it to take concrete action toward addressing problems
of social and economic importance). Petitions presented to Parliament were
sorted by appointed judges and clerks known as “receivers,” who would
review them, and either refer them to Parliament for resolution or transfer
them to the appropriate prerogative court.57 Those referred to Parliament
would be sent to an appointed committee of “triers,” usually nobles and
bishops, for adjudication, and the contents of the petition, along with the
answers of the triers, would be recorded or “enrolled” on the Rolls of
Parliament at the end of each session.58 Prior to Parliament’s assumption of
formal legislative powers, petitioning also developed into a quasi-legislative
function, as the House of Commons would aggregate private petitions into
consolidated commons petitions to present to the Crown for royal assent.59
The records of petitions thus provided an account of the evolving scope of
Parliament’s jurisdiction to address questions of policy.
In addition to contributing to the formation of a parliamentary identity,
petitioning also first established the legal authority of the Rolls as documents.
Because of the judicial nature of Parliament’s petition work, the sections of
the Rolls that reflected the hearing of petitions were the first portions to be
recognized as having precedential force outside of the legislature itself.60 The
petitions that were resolved by Parliament, rather than referred to a
prerogative court, were often politically important, and the lords elected to
act as triers were well educated in the common law.61 Edward Coke noted
in the Fourth Institute that the comparatively thorough legal reasoning of
Parliament’s petition resolution was a primary factor in elevating the
authority of the Rolls, observing that “[t]he reason wherefore the Records of
Parliament have been so highly extolled, is, for that therein is set down in
cases of difficulty, not only the judgment, or resolution, but the reasons, and
55
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MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 294.
MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 294, 298–99.
See Pollard, supra note 45, at 202–04; see also 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 11 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1681) (describing the duties of receivers).
See 4 COKE, supra note 57, at 11.
MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 356–57.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that the Parliament Rolls were “necessarily authoritative in
regard to the legal cases heard in parliament”); see also H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles, The Early
Records of the English Parliament, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES, at V 130
(1981) (describing the documents prepared in the hearing of petitions and situations in which they
were relied upon).
Richardson & Sayles, supra note 60, at VI 535–36.
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causes of the same by so great advice,” and that while other common law
courts recorded the reasoning for their holdings, “these also, though of great
credit, and excellent use in their kind, yet far underneath the Authority of
the Parliament Rols [sic], reporting the Acts, Judgments, and resolutions of
that highest Court.” 62 Through the recording of petitions, Parliament came
to understand itself as an institution that could interpret law as a court—it
was in this period that it first came to be referred to as the “high court of
Parliament”—and expect its interpretations to bind both subjects and
coordinate governing institutions.63 It also came to see its Rolls as a critical
source of legal precedent—as documents whose cataloguing of past
legislative actions provided guidance in the resolution of future disputes. As
Commons petitions became more frequent, Parliament came to rely on the
assistance of clerks (who had both access to the Roll archives at Chancery
and knowledge of their contents) to draft petitions that referenced the
precedents of previous Parliaments in order to strengthen their arguments.64
Moreover, as the scope of Parliament’s activity expanded, and as it
sought a stronger and permanent role in making and administering policy, it
increasingly viewed the Rolls in their entirety—not just those portions that
reflected its judicial business—as precedentially binding documents. While
its judicial functions were delegated to committees of lords, the idea of
Parliament as a legal institution was not limited to those committees. As
historian G.O. Sayles has observed, “parliament is a single whole: its parts
do not function separately: it is subject to a unifying authority.”65 For
instance, in 1353, local representatives meeting with Commons specifically
insisted that an ordinance that had been issued at the previous session “shall
be repeated at the next parliament and entered in the roll of the same
parliament, for the reason that the ordinances and agreements made in
councils are not on record as they would be if they were made by common
parliament.”66 Conversely, in 1404, Commons specifically demanded that
its agreement to consent to an extraordinary tax levy not be recorded in the
Rolls, and that all copies of the agreement be burned, so that it could not be
used as a precedent for future grants.67 Demands such as these reflect a
growing recognition that the written records of Parliament’s interaction with
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4 COKE, supra note 57, at 34.
See, e.g., 4 HATSELL supra note 67, at 78 (tracing records of the judicial proceedings of the “High
Court of Parliament” to the reign of Edward I (1239-1307)).
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 54–56 (footnotes omitted). Occasionally the clerks may have even
intentionally misrepresented past practices as a means of helping the Commons to strengthen its
case. Id.
Richardson & Sayles, supra note 60, at VI 532.
Ormrod, supra note 47, at 43 (citing 2 PARLIAMENT ROLLS, supra note 30, at 253).
Chris Given-Wilson, The Rolls of Parliament, 1399–1421, 23 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 57, 64 (2004).
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the Crown could have legal implications for the authority of the legislature
and its place within the broader architecture of government.68
Aside from recording the accumulated body of Parliament’s legislative
and adjudicatory work, the Rolls also recorded the traditions by which the
legislature managed itself and disposed of its growing docket of public
business. Because Parliaments initially met infrequently, and were composed
of a frequently changing membership, they required a robust institutional
memory of how business was transacted, and how the two houses of the
legislature interacted with each other and the Crown. This institutional
memory was learned primarily from the Rolls, which recorded the narrative
history of prior sessions of Parliament, and thus provided a blueprint for the
order of business in future sittings. Perhaps the most important procedural
development to emerge from the Rolls was the power of impeachment,
which was exercised for the first time in 1376 against William Latimer, a
Chamberlain of the Household of Edward III. Commons accused Latimer
on the Rolls of Parliament of corrupt dealings with the King, and Latimer,
being a peer, denied the charges and demanded his right of trial by the Lords,
where he was ultimately convicted.69 The precedent of accusation by
Commons and trial by the Lords (according to procedures of their choosing)
served as the basis for all future trials for those who were considered outside
the jurisdiction of the prerogative courts.70
Another significant change was the creation of the position of Speaker.71
Speakers represented the entire House and presented requests to the Crown
on their behalf. On an institution-building level, this innovation was an
important step in developing the corporate identity of Parliament as a
cohesive entity that bargained collectively with the monarch for political
concessions. On a practical level, it also insulated individual members from
retribution for voicing controversial opinions, a legitimate fear for much of
Parliament’s history.72 Speakers also took primary responsibility for
resolving disputes over the order of proceedings, a role which greatly
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See Ormrod, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that while the “memoranda” on policy questions in the
Parliament Rolls were not formally acknowledged as legally binding in the fourteenth century,
“[n]evertheless, it does seem that the status of parliament as a court of record was also now of more
general importance and was deemed relevant to other substantive business such as taxation and
legislation”).
See 4 John Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 57 (London, Luke Hansard
& Sons 1818).
See id. at 56–69.
See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 212–17 (citing the Rolls and Journals to trace the evolution of this
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One of the most famous early examples of this sort of retribution was Haxey’s case, described infra,
and in JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 69–70 (2007).
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facilitated the development of other areas of parliamentary law.73 Precedents
of parliamentary practice such as these formed the basis for the modern law
of legislative procedure. They came to be regarded as the authoritative
source for resolving disputes over the proper means of introducing, debating,
and enacting legislation, and for carrying out other parliamentary business.
Both the Crown and the legislature quickly recognized the practical
importance of procedural precedents. As Arthur Onslow, an eighteenthcentury Clerk of Commons, observed, “the forms of proceeding, as instituted
by our ancestors, operated as a check and controul on the actions of
Ministers; and that they were, in many instances, a shelter and protection to
the minority, against the attempts of power.”74 Because the procedure of
Parliament controlled how it conducted its affairs, and how it interacted with
the monarch, procedural precedents could have a meaningful impact on the
legislature’s ability to negotiate effectively and wield political influence.
Inefficient procedure, or procedure that yielded strategic advantages to the
Crown, could alter the outcome of substantive debates over law, policy, and
finance. As a result, both Parliament and the monarchy sought to establish
favorable precedents on the legislature’s official records. This impulse—or,
conversely, the impulse to grant a procedural concession in a specific instance
while stipulating that it should not be used as a precedent for future
practice—is reflected throughout the Parliament Rolls. For instance, in
1402, Henry IV approved a parliamentary request to appoint a committee
of Lords to “intercommune” with the Commons, but only “with the
reservation that he did not wish to make this a right or a custom,” and that
he had only “agreed to it of his special grace on this occasion;” he thus
“charged the clerk of parliament that this reservation should be recorded on
the Roll of Parliament.”75
These procedural disputes could have significant implications for the
operation of government. In 1407, under Henry IV, a dispute over a grant
of supply led to the establishment of two foundational elements of
parliamentary law: (1) that all money bills must originate in the House of
Commons, and (2) that the Crown may not take notice of any debate in
Parliament until the two houses have come to an agreement and presented a
formal report of their decision.76 Henry had requested the Lords to debate,
in his presence, the state of the kingdom, and the necessity of granting
subsidies to the Crown in order to secure the national defense. After the
Lords had specified the requisite sums, the King had sent a deputation to the
Commons to demand that they assent to the grant. The maneuver
73
74
75
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See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 230–36 (citing examples of the exercise of this function from the
Rolls and Journals).
See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 237.
Given-Wilson, supra note 67, at 64.
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represented a transparent attempt by the King to deny Commons any
meaningful role in the tax deliberations, by presenting them a finalized grant
of supply and, in effect, demanding their assent. The Commons realized that
allowing the process to stand on the Rolls as precedent could damage its
ability to control the money supply in the future—a power which was, in the
Middle Ages, its chief source of political leverage. It thus recorded a reply to
Henry stating that it was “greatly disturbed at it, saying and affirming it to
be much to the prejudice and derogation of their liberties,” and refused to
approve the supply.77 The King yielded to the Commons’ pressure, and
agreed that the Crown would no longer receive such reports from one house
of Parliament before both had “commune[d]” with each other.78 He was
further compelled that this concession “should be entered as a record on the
roll of parliament.”79 Henry Elsynge, the Clerk of the House of Commons
in the early seventeenth century and one of the first treatise-writers to make
a comprehensive study of the precedents contained in the Rolls and Journals,
later confirmed the effect of this agreement, writing that it could not be
shown “by any antient [sic] record, that the king did ever take notice of any
of the commons speeches or consultations, until they were reported unto his
majesty in open Parliament.”80 The written precedents contained in the
Rolls thus formed the primary basis for justifying Parliament’s procedures,
and its liberties against the Crown, as a foundational aspect of the law of
English government.
With respect to the Parliament’s role as a check on royal authority, the
Rolls served two functions: they (1) recorded the evolution of Parliament’s
privileges against interference and harassment by the Crown, and (2)
recorded Parliament’s official protests of what it perceived to be
unconstitutional exercises of royal authority. With respect to the first
function, parliamentary privileges are rights which, as the former Clerk of
the House of Commons Sir Thomas Erskine May observed in his influential
treatise on parliamentary practice, “are necessary for the support of [its]
authority, and for the proper exercise of the functions entrusted to [it] by the
constitution.”81 Like the recording of parliamentary procedure, the Rolls’
and Journals’ elaboration of parliamentary privileges was precedential in
nature. At its beginning, Parliament had no privileges of its own, but, as
council and advisers to the King, claimed certain rights (specifically, the right
of access to the King and the Speaker of the House of Commons, freedom
from arrest while Parliament was in session, and freedom of speech) in their
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 260.
Id. at 260–61; see also HENRY ELSYNGE, THE MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND
182 (London, Richardson & Clark 1768) (1624) (describing this exchange).
Given-Wilson, supra note 67, at 64.
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capacity as servants of the Crown.82 For instance, in an answer to a petition
to Edward I seeking leave to distrain, or seize property, for a debt owed by a
member of Parliament, the King replied that “[i]t does not seem fit that the
king should grant that they who are of his council should be distrained in
time of Parliament.”83 This concession later served as the basis for the
privilege of freedom from arrest.84 Parliament asserted such rights, which
derived from royal prerogative, in petitions to the King, and those petitions
along with the King’s answers were recorded in the Rolls and Journals.
But as precedents proliferated, parliamentarians became more willing to
assert these privileges as longstanding Anglo-Saxon rights that existed
independent of the royal will. Early treatise writers and lawyers relied heavily
on the Rolls and Journals to prove the existence of inviolable legislative
privileges in English law. Freedom from arrest was never established by
statute. Indeed, the Lords refused to assent to a Commons petition to
Henry IV seeking treble damages for a violation of its freedom from arrest,
reasoning that sufficient penalties already existed in parliamentary law.85 But
Elsynge suggested that this refusal by the Lords merely reflected the strength
(and institutional importance) of recorded parliamentary precedent. He
argued that the Lords preferred to keep privilege of freedom from arrest, and
the associated damages, as a matter of “antient custom” recorded on the
Rolls, rather than enacting it into statute.86 To request the King’s assent to
such a law would suggest that Parliament lacked the authority to establish its
privileges and to assess punishment for breaches through their own records
alone; the Lords “thought it more honourable to retain it, than to enact a
new law to punish the contemners of their privileges, as if they had not been
otherwise able to do it of themselves, but were subject to scorn and
contempt.”87
Elsynge dated the Crown’s implicit recognition of the privilege of
freedom of speech to at least the reign of Edward III, observing that the Rolls
reflected that “[Commons] did oftentimes . . . discuss and debate among
themselves many things . . . ; and agreed upon petitions for laws to be made
. . . yet they were never interrupted in their consultations, nor received check
for the same.”88 The privilege was, in the account of most legal authorities,
“signally confirmed” by Henry IV in 1397, in Haxey’s case.89 Thomas
Haxey, a Member of Commons, had been condemned for treason by
Richard II for introducing a bill criticizing the expenses of the royal
82
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ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81 at 128 (quoting 1 PARLIAMENT ROLLS supra note 30, at 61).
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household. On the ascension of Henry IV, Haxey presented a petition asking
the King to annul the judgment as “against the law and custom which had
been before in Parliament,” which the King did, confirming in the Rolls that
the former judgment was “of no force or effect.”90 The Commons’ 1407
dispute with Henry IV over the King’s right to take notice of debates within
either House of Parliament also served as an important precedent for
Members of Parliament’s (MP’s) right to free speech.91 “If the king might not
take notice of the subsidy” he had agreed to with the Lords outside the
presence of Commons, then, Elsynge concluded, “much less might any thing
else moved amongst the commons be reported unto his majesty before the
commons were fully agreed thereon, and declared the same by their speaker,
or otherwise, either unto the king or lords.”92 Similar precedents on the Rolls
and Journals dating through the sixteenth century served as continuous
confirmations of the privilege’s pedigree, though it too was never confirmed
by statute.93 By the sixteenth century, the existence of Parliament’s core
privileges was ritually invoked by the Commons’ Speaker at the beginning of
each session: the Speaker would formally petition the Crown for a
recognition of the liberties, and both the request and the Crown’s response
would be recorded in the Journals.94 The assertion of such precedential
authority for parliamentary privilege would not have been possible without
the increasingly sophisticated record-keeping systems that evolved from the
thirteenth century onward.95
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In addition to establishing the law of privilege, a second means by which
the Rolls served as a check on royal power was through the recording of
protests. As early as the thirteenth century, prior to the introduction of the
Rolls, Parliament used written records as medium for criticizing crown
policy, or for emphasizing that their assent to taxation only permitted funds
to be spent in certain ways. Matthew Paris records that when Parliament
convened in 1242 to debate a request from Henry III to finance a military
expedition in France,96 they granted further funds, but only on the condition
that the King first make good-faith attempts to negotiate for peace, and “in
order that the tenour of the barons’ reply might not be lost in oblivion, these
things were all reduced to writing,” memorializing the agreement.97 A
similar grant in 1244 included a written record of the King’s agreement that
military expenditures be overseen by a committee of nobles.98 In its early
years, these protests began to instill Parliament with a collective
understanding that its rights and its interests were separate from those of the
Crown. As Parliament grew in size and influence, and as its control over
taxation became established by the precedent of successive Kings, protests
entered on the Rolls began to exercise a meaningful constraining effect on
the Crown. By the fourteenth century, the legislature began to enter
conditions for how the Crown could spend grants of supply on the Rolls, and
to demand oversight of royal expenditures from independent treasurers. For
instance, in 1348, Commons specifically insisted that the conditions which
they had attached to the grant of a new tax “should be entered on the
parliament roll as a matter of record, by which the commonalty could have
remedy, if anything is attempted to the contrary in times to come.’’99 In
1371, the Commons unsuccessfully petitioned the Crown to appoint a
committee of treasurers to oversee the expenditure of funds.100 But, by the
1400s, it had become common practice for Commons to make grants of
supply dependent on the Crown’s fulfillment of certain conditions, which
were recorded in the Parliament Rolls. In 1404, for instance, Commons
granted a large supply to Henry IV on the condition that it be expended
according to the terms of the grant, and that the dispensation be overseen by
treasurers appointed by Parliament.101
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Parliament also combined the practice of protesting with its leverage over
taxation to demand that successive Kings “confirm” rights that were either
granted to Parliament in the Magna Carta, or other charters, or were
believed to exist as a matter of governing precedent, in exchange for grants
of supply. In 1297, Edward I issued the best-known confirmation, the
Confirmatio Cartarum, a reaffirmation of the rights granted in the Magna Carta,
in exchange for Parliament’s grant of supply for war in France. Parliament
was particularly eager to reaffirm the principle that no taxes could be levied
without its consent, as it worried that their consent “might turn to a bondage
to them and their heirs, because they might be at another time found in the
rolls,” and thus made explicit in their record that “we shall not draw such
aids, tasks nor prises into a custom, for anything that hath been done
heretofore, or that may be found by roll in any other manner.”102
Confirmations like this enjoyed an ambiguous status, as something between
a routine legislative record and (because they received a form of royal assent)
something like a statute.103 Yet monarchs could and often did attempt to
ignore the terms of these agreements: Henry III inspired numerous protests
by his supposed disregard for the terms of the Magna Carta and its
subsequent confirmations.104 Edward I went so far as to receive an
absolution from Pope Clement V authorizing him to disregard the
Confirmatio, though he never acted on it.105 The real value of the
confirmations was not in the binding effect of a single record entry, but in
the cumulative effect of successive monarchs agreeing on public record to be
bound by the charters in exchange for financial assistance. They were, like
other parliamentary rights, precedential in nature.
By providing an authoritative chronology of Parliament’s rights, its
procedures, and its position within the broader constitutional order, the Rolls
and Journals played a critical part in establishing the legislature as a legal
entity with a coherent identity and a claim to state power. They facilitated
its transition, in the words of G.O. Sayles, from an “occasion” to an
“institution.”106 This first aspect of the Journals’ importance might be
labeled a ‘constitutional law-producing’ function. Early Parliaments did not
necessarily conceive of themselves as permanent institutions that constituted
part of a broader constitutional order. They did not initially believe that they
were engaging in a legal discourse by, for instance, petitioning for recognition
102
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of privileges; or establishing written traditions of debate and internal
organization; or receiving requests from private petitioners; or creating a
written record of their criticisms of crown policy. But they did understand
themselves as inhabiting a world governed in part by tradition, and in part
by a series of carefully negotiated agreements with a nearly absolute
monarch. And they understood the importance of creating a written record
that interpreted those traditions and agreements favorably, and they created
space in the constitutional order for an institution that could restrain the
monarchy and represent the interests of other social and political
stakeholders. The use of written records to develop those traditions built a
body of precedent that ultimately came to be accepted as public law and
formed the foundations of English constitutionalism.
B. Journals in the Sixteenth Century
By the sixteenth century, Parliament did begin to develop an institutional
consciousness and to conceive of itself as institution with legal rights and
obligations within a broader constitutional order. The legislature was still
largely subservient to royal will: Parliaments did not meet regularly, and
criticism of crown policy was infrequent.107 But while Parliament did not
make any dramatic claims to constitutional authority, it did begin to establish
its institutional autonomy in significant ways. The Speaker reasserted the
existence of Parliament’s privileges at the opening of each session, and
Commons began to assert the right to enforce its own privileges through its
Serjeant-at-Arms.108 Legislative procedure was formalized considerably, and
rules of proceeding were further reticulated.109 New and more sophisticated
fixtures of internal organization were established. For instance, in 1571,
Commons established a “committee for motions of griefs and petitions” for
the first time to centralize the process of formulating petitions to the Crown
and reducing them to writing.110 This process instituted a more systematic
study of Parliament’s historic records (which provided legal precedents on
which petitions could draw), and also pushed Parliament further in the
direction of recording new requests for relief in a regularized format, and
according to a predetermined strategy.111
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The process for introducing and enacting legislation was also refined.
Bills and petitions were still used interchangeably to request the monarch’s
assent to official acts.112 But Parliament now used these devices more
aggressively to attempt to initiate topics for discussion and legislation, an
initiative that had previously belonged, for the most part, to the Crown.113
Most prominently, the Commons repeatedly attempted to petition
Elizabeth I for a redress of grievances concerning the grant of royal
monopolies. While the queen was willing to negotiate on the substance of
these complaints, she consistently maneuvered to prevent the parliamentary
record from reflecting that the initiative for reform had originated with
Parliament rather than the Crown. In 1571, 1589, and again in 1598,
Elizabeth I, aware that petitions were being formulated by the Committee
for Motions of Griefs and Petitions, preempted formal requests for legislation
by promising her own relief.114 Commons was also aware of the precedential
importance of records reflecting the Crown’s accession to its demands, and
sought to record that accession in the Journals despite the queen’s evasions.
In 1601, when the Queen again promised monopoly reform in response to a
parliamentary petition, a member moved that her response “might be
written in the books and records of this House.”115 Robert Cecil, the Queen’s
chief minister, demurred on the request, replying that the Queen did not idly
“notify in public a matter of this weight.”116 Other members insisted. One
protested that, “[a]s the Gospel is registered and written, so would I have
that also.”117 Another observed that “[r]ecords remain [in existence for] long
[periods of time]” and urged that “the clerk may” record the response.118 It
is not known whether the reply was ultimately recorded on the Journal, since
it has been lost (the Queen’s proclamation on monopolies appeared the next
day),119 but the exchanges over monopoly reform reflect an understanding
on the part of both Crown and Parliament that procedural records in the
Journals could have meaningful implications for the balance of power within
government.
All of these developments were made possible by the existence of
increasingly sophisticated records: more elaborate procedures required more
meticulous documentation; more aggressive assertions of parliamentary
authority required a longer and more convincing pedigree. It was in the
early sixteenth century that the Journals supplanted the Rolls as the official
documents of legislative activity and began to assume their present form.
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While the Rolls encompassed the activity of Parliament as a whole, the
Journals were divided into two separate series of books: one for the Lords,
which began in 1509, and another for Commons, beginning in 1547.120
More and better educated clerks were tasked with modernizing Journal
practice; transcription was improved; the format of records was
rationalized.121
Procedural steps were also taken to ensure that Journal manuscripts were
approved by the membership of each house and protected from tampering.
The Clerks of Parliament were now selected by the Houses and appointed
by the Crown under letters patent. They were appointed to serve for life,
suggesting that they were intended to be politically independent, and
insulated from periodic changes in the composition of Parliament. Upon
assuming office, each Clerk took an oath, kneeling before the Lord
Chancellor, swearing to: “[M]ak[e] true entries, remembrances, and journals
of the things done and past in the same . . . [and] keep secret all such matters
as shall be treated in his said Parliaments; and not disclose the same before
they shall be published, but to such as it ought to be disclosed unto.”122
Indeed, in 1641, the Clerk was sanctioned for allowing a Member to take
the Journals from the Clerk’s table and examine them without the permission
of the House. In response, it was resolved that:
[I]t was a fundamental order of the House, that the Clerk, who is the sworn
officer, and intrusted with the entries, and the custody of the records of the
House, ought not to suffer any Journal or record to be taken from the table,
or out of his custody; and that if he shall hereafter do it, after this warning,
that at his peril he shall do it.123

Clerks were forbidden from making entries into the Journals except on
the orders of the House, and individual Members could not, of their own
initiative, direct the official records of the session to be altered. For instance,
in 1628, when the House of Lords requested the Journal record of a speech
made by a Member of the House of Commons, Commons replied that no
such record existed on its books, because the transcription “was without
warrant at all times, and in that Parliament, by order of the House, rejected
and left.”124 Clerks, thus, did not take notes of proceedings “without the
precedent directions and command of the House, but only of the Orders and
Reports made in this House.”125 Thus even if a speech was made in
Parliament, and “any number of Members, call[ed] out to have them taken
down . . . this call of particular Members, though ever so general, is not
properly, indeed cannot be, an Order of the House.” 126 In short, as
120
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Parliament began to rely more heavily on its precedents to build sophisticated
structures of internal organization, and to press more ambitious claims of
privilege against the Crown, it became aware of the need for official records
that were equal to those tasks, and that accurately reflected its decisions on
points of parliamentary law.
More significantly, both parliamentarians and other English legal
authorities began to conceive of the increasingly sophisticated body of
institutional history collected in the Journals not only as received tradition,
but as law. Because Parliament had historically spent a significant portion of
its time adjudicating petitions for relief—either in the form of complaints
against abusive royal officials, or requests for assistance through private
bills—it had come to be regarded not only as a legislature, but also a “court
of record”—in the words of one contemporary, “the highest and most
authentical court of England.”127 From the fourteenth century onward, only
the House of Lords exercised formal judicial functions, such as the hearing
of appeals from royal courts.128 But in the sixteenth and seventeenth century,
parliamentarians and other legal authorities began to regard the broader
universe of precedent contained in Parliament’s records—those aspects that
touched on privilege, procedure, and Parliament’s attempts to enforce the
obligations of the monarch through its control of taxation; not just its
adjudication of private petitions—as a coherent body of law, as authoritative
in the realm of government as the common law was in private law. This
doctrine was known to English authorities as the lex et consuendo Parliamenti
(“lex Parliamenti”), or the “law of Parliament.”129
And just as the common law could be learned from the records of
judgments by common law courts (which were also assuming a more
regularized format in this era),130 so could the law of Parliament be learned
from consulting the records of legislative judgments contained in the Rolls
and Journals. By the seventeenth century, it was widely accepted that “[t]he
Laws, Customs, Liberties, and Privileges of Parliament are better to be
learn’d out of the Rolls of Parliament, and other Records, and by Precedents,
and continual Experience, then [sic] can be expressed by any one mans [sic]
pen.”131 Two doctrinal developments in this era are of particular
importance. First, through statutory acts and through the gradual
accumulation of a body of legal thought contained in influential treatises,
127
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Parliament affirmed that its records were the authoritative sources of the lex
Parliamenti. Parliament first suggested that the Journals were official state
records in 1514 in “An Act Concerning the Burgesses of the Parliament,”
which prohibited members of Parliament from departing before the end of a
parliamentary session, unless they had received the license of the Speaker,
“and the same license be entered of record in the book of the clerk of the
Parliament appointed or to be appointed for the common house.”132 Many
later British treatise writers identified this 1514 statute as establishing the
Journals as official records of Parliament. The Lex Parliamentaria, a prominent
seventeenth-century treatise, noted that the “Book of the Clerk of the House
of Commons is a Record, as it is affirmed by Act of Parliament, 6 Hen. 8,
c.16.”133 Edward Coke, in the Institutes, likewise noted that “the Journals of
the house of the lords, and the book of the clerk of the house of commons,
. . . is a record, as it is affirmed by act of Parliament in anno 6 H. 8. ca. 16.”134
These records were thus widely acknowledged as the most authentic
source of parliamentary law. Erskine May later summarized:
The only method . . . of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of the
common law, is by shewing that it hath always been the custom to observe
it . . . it is laid down as a general rule that the decisions of courts of justice
are the evidence of what is common law. The same rule is strictly applicable
to matters of privilege, and to the expounding of the unwritten law of
Parliament.135

By the seventeenth century, Edward Coke could even proclaim that
records of “common law courts” were “far underneath the authority of the
Parliament rols [sic].”136 In short, by the end of the sixteenth century,
Parliament was able to claim that its judgments as recorded in its Journals
represented binding law on questions of legislative power and privilege.
The second principle Parliament asserted was that only it had the right
to determine the contents of its own records. Blackstone wrote that “the
whole of the law and custom of Parliament has it’s [sic] origin from this one
maxim; ‘that whatever matter arises concerning either house of Parliament,
ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it
relates, and not elsewhere.’”137 “Hence,” May later confirmed, “it follows
that whatever the Parliament has constantly declared to be a privilege, is the
only evidence of its being part of the ancient law of Parliament.” 138 This
meant that not only Parliament, but the Crown and courts, were required to
132
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accept Parliament’s records as definitive evidence of parliamentary law, such
that “by another law and custome of Parliament the king cannot take notice
of any thing said or done in the House of Commons, but by the report of the
House of Commons.”139 By the end of the seventeenth century, it was widely
accepted that Parliament’s Journals were conclusive, self-authenticating
evidence of what was said and done by the legislature. John Hatsell, the
Clerk of the House of Commons in the late eighteenth century and the
author of a well-known treatise on parliamentary procedure, recorded in
1785 that “the Journal of the lords is a record, to which every subject may
resort for information; and the mode of acquiring this information to the
House of Commons, is, by their appointing a Committee to inspect the
record, and to report the same to them.”140
C. Journal-Keeping as Constitutional Argument During the English Civil War
The Stuart period and the Civil War era revealed the full potential of
official legislative records to advance substantive constitutional arguments.
Two innovations in Journal practice were particularly important to this
evolution. One was Parliament’s adaptation of centuries-old procedural
mechanisms to make new and more ambitious claims on sovereign authority.
Charles I’s avowed belief in a powerful monarchy, his suspected Roman
Catholic sympathies, and his aggressive attempts to collect revenue without
the consent of Parliament precipitated fears about the security of England’s
legislative institutions and Protestant religion. In response to perceived
encroachments on parliamentary rights, MPs and legal authorities
marshaled evidence to contest the legality of the Crown’s actions. Elsynge,
as Clerk of Commons, combed laboriously through the old Rolls to collect
precedents supporting the House of Lords’ power of impeachment, which it
began to wield against corrupt royal officials.141 The Rolls and the Journals
gained new prominence as proof of a centuries-old tradition of parliamentary
independence and negotiated power-sharing agreements between the
legislature and the Crown. Parliamentarians realized that it was to their
advantage to interpret these records in ways that legitimized their claims to
constitutional authority, by presenting them as the logical extension of the
body of parliamentary law that had accumulated since the thirteenth
century. As disputes over sovereignty escalated, MPs with legal training,
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such as Edward Coke, engaged in a project of re-conceptualizing Journalkeeping as an explicit form of legal argument. The most visible manifestation
of this trend was in the use of ancient parliamentary procedures, such as the
practice of petitioning or entering protests of crown policy on the legislative
record, to draft and publicize legal arguments. Many of the most significant
constitutional documents of the seventeenth century followed this pattern.
The 1628 Petition of Right, for instance, adapted the ancient practice of
petitioning the Crown for private legislation to a new, more explicitly
constitutional purpose: demanding the Crown’s recognition of certain
fundamental limitations on royal authority, including the power to levy taxes
without parliamentary consent and to impose martial law.142 It was a radical
reimagining of the concept of petitions, which in previous centuries had
requested specific forms of assistance or asked for the Crown’s confirmation
of longstanding privileges, and it was the product of several decades’ worth
of reforms to petition procedure.143 From the beginning of James I’s reign in
1604, Parliament’s own understanding of its place in the constitutional order
diverged sharply with the Crown’s. Petitioning, which became significantly
more formalized in this period, played a critical role in mediating the
constitutional disputes that ensued. Parliament continued to assert the right
to initiate reform legislation, rather than to merely request concessions from
the Crown in exchange for grants of supply. It also began to request
concessions from the Crown on issues that had historically been considered
solely within the royal prerogative, such as foreign relations, royal marriage,
and monopolies. In 1621, for instance, the Commons presented a
“remonstrance and petition” to James I criticizing his position on
Catholicism, and his proposed marriage of Prince Charles into the Spanish
Hapsburgs, by which they sought to “humbly . . . shew . . . what may be
prejudicial to the King and the state.”144
In advancing new legal claims, Parliament was assisted by a subtle
procedural development in the manner of drafting and presenting petitions.
Historically, there had been no single process for petitioning the Crown, and
aside from the distinction between individual and Commons petitions, the
petitions themselves were not subdivided into separate legal instruments. In
the early seventeenth century, under the guidance of Edward Coke,
Parliament came to differentiate between petitions of “grace” and petitions
of “right.”145 Petitions of grace requested an act of grace from the Crown—
a gratuity that it was under no obligation to provide—and therefore did not
require an answer. These were useful, because they allowed Parliament to
document its increasing participation in areas of policy traditionally reserved
142
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for the Crown, while minimizing any immediate claims on legal authority,
and thereby reducing the risk of royal backlash. Petitions of right, on the
other hand, presented grievances to the Crown, usually after the grievances
had been investigated by a committee, and demanded redress as a matter of
law. By inventing the concept of a petition of right, Parliament impliedly
assumed the authority to declare its own rights and the rights of its subjects,
and to insist that the Crown bring its policies into conformity with those
rights—a dramatically new claim to constitutional power. In 1604, for
instance, Commons submitted a petition criticizing the Crown’s exercise of
its purveyance power (historically a matter of prerogative) as “against law
and right.”146 Though Commons conceded the Crown’s prerogative to exact
purveyance (i.e., the right to purchase provisions at less than market value),
it claimed to have proven through committee investigations that the
prerogative had been exercised abusively, and therefore illegally.147 While
theoretically limited in their scope, such petitions memorialized an important
shift in parliamentary thinking: Parliament had begun to assume the
authority to judge the legality of the Crown’s actions.
The tradition of entering protests of crown policy on the Journals, too,
was adapted to advance new constitutional arguments. Where previous
protests had objected to the King’s execution of specific domestic or military
projects, Civil War-era protests made more aggressive demands for the
reform of royal administration and openly asserted Parliament’s rights and
privileges as immutable aspects of the English constitution. Unlike petitions,
remonstrances neither asked for the Crown’s cooperation as a matter of
grace nor demanded it as a matter of right: they simply declared on the
parliamentary record that the Crown had acted contrary to law in some way.
The Stuart Kings were aware of Parliament’s attempts to build a written
record of its privileges and its right to participate in deliberations on issues
touching the royal prerogative and resented them. In 1614, James I issued a
warning to Parliament “against excess of lavish and licentious speech of
matters of state,” speech which Parliament considered privileged under its
right to freedom of debate.148 The conflict culminated in 1621, when the
King sent a message to Parliament justifying the detention of MP Sir Edwyn
Sandys, who had been arrested in connection with his opposition activities.149
James reprimanded “those fiery spirits of some of the House of Commons,
who had presumed to argue and debate publicly of matters far above their
146
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reach and capacity, tending to our high dishonor, and breach of Prerogative
Royal,”150 and commanded Parliament to “resolve” that the Crown was
“very free and able to punish any man’s misdemeanors in Parliament.”151
The Commons, outraged at the King’s open attack on its freedom of speech,
responded with a remonstrance stating that its privileges were “its ancient
and undoubted birthright.”152 The protest was ordered to be “presently
entered of Record in the Journal of the House.”153 The King, in a final
attempt to abrogate Parliament’s claimed right to opine on matters of state,
“sen[t] for the Journal Book,” and struck out the “[e]ntry with his own
hand,” and “in full assembly of his Council, and in the presence of the Judges,
did declare the said protestation to be invalid, annulled, void, and of no
effect,” and ordered it “erased out of all memorials, and utterly
annihilated.”154 The ringleaders of the protest, including Coke and John
Pym, were imprisoned in the Tower of London for their role in drafting it.155
Likewise, in 1626, Charles I reprimanded Parliament for conducting an
“unparliamentary inquisition” against the Duke of Buckingham, a close
personal ally, and warned it against interfering in matters of state.156
Commons again responded with a “[r]emonstrance,”157 in which they
informed the King that “it hath been the ancient, constant, and undoubted
right and usage of [P]arliaments, to question and complain of all persons of
what degree soever, found grievous to the commonwealth.” 158
The tradition of protestation reached its apotheosis in the Grand
Remonstrance, a sweeping list of 204 grievances presented to Charles I in
1641. Like the Petition of Right, the Grand Remonstrance adopted a form
of parliamentary record that had previously been used to address specific
grievances, and used it to demand systemic constitutional change, requesting
changes in religious policy and parliamentary oversight of royal
administration.159 The implication of the document was that the sovereign
authority of the Crown was bounded by the constraints of English law, a
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position Charles I resisted. Also like the Petition of Right, the Remonstrance
was so bold it proved unacceptable to the King and precipitated yet another
dissolution of Parliament. As one historian of the English Civil War has
summarized, the Remonstrance “masqueraded as a document for the
attention of the King, but it was in truth addressed to the people: it was a
public statement by the Commons accusing the King, a procedure as yet
unheard of in the annals of England.”160 Both the Petition of Right and the
Grand Remonstrance demonstrated the possibility of adapting ancient
parliamentary forms of record-keeping to assert new rights and powers on
behalf of the legislature, and to situate new claims to constitutional authority
within existing legal traditions.
The second innovation in Journal practice during the seventeenth
century was Parliament’s creation of new record-keeping procedures to
manage this body of written precedent as it rapidly increased in size and
complexity. The developments of the Stuart era—the appropriation of old
legislative functions to challenge royal authority; the reinvention of old
judicial functions to try cases of impeachment and attainder—transformed
Parliament into an institution that purposefully and self-consciously
interpreted constitutional law. The Rolls and the Journals incentivized
Parliament to reason precedentially and provided the legislature with the
legal and procedural vocabulary to bolster its legitimacy by situating its rise
to supremacy within the historical evolution of the English state. But the
purpose of employing a body of official records to advance claims on
constitutional power was to demonstrate that those claims derived naturally
from existing notions of law and existing understandings of the distribution
of authority within the state. The rapid proliferation of new Journal
entries—new assertions of parliamentary privilege, more expansive claims on
the legislature’s jurisdiction, new and more sophisticated forms of legislative
procedure—could threaten to subvert the usefulness of those records by
transforming them into a jumble of opportunistic and contradictory
constitutional arguments.
As succeeding regimes gained control of the legislature—from the Long
Parliament, to the Restoration Parliament, to the Cavalier Parliament and
the Convention Parliament of 1689—they recognized the need to harmonize
parliamentary precedent with Parliament’s present claims about the
structure of the constitution. New Journal-keeping devices facilitated this
harmonization. One was a procedure known alternatively as “expurgation,”
“erasure,” or “obliteration.” By “expunging” a Journal entry, a house voted
to order the clerk to cross that entry out of the relevant Journal book,
officially “erasing” it from the parliamentary record and voiding it of
precedential effect. In a sense, expurgation was also an innovation on an
older form of Journal-keeping procedure. The Houses of Parliament had
160
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long exercised the right to alter their Journals to correct factual errors or
errors in transcription (which were more common in earlier eras, before the
professionalization of the clerical staff).161 Seventeenth-century Journal
practice expanded the conception of error correction to encompass not only
factual errors, but legal or constitutional errors as well. Under this new
understanding, an “incorrect” constitutional judgment of Parliament could
be erased from its records, no differently than a Clerk’s error in recording a
vote or the enrollment of a petition. The Long Parliament began this
practice in the 1640s. In 1645, the House of Commons ordered the vacation
and expurgation from the Journals of an order from 1643 impeaching and
expelling the member Henry Marten for suggesting the abolition of the
monarchy.162 Likewise, in 1647 both Houses of Parliament ordered the
expurgation of a petition that had been accepted and enrolled the previous
year which criticized the conduct of the parliamentary army. The order
stated that:
The Lords and Commons, being tender of the Honour of the said Army,
have thought fit to Ordain and Declare, and be it Declared and Ordained,
. . .That the said former Declaration . . . be rased and expunged out of the
Records and Books of the said Houses; and wholly taken away, and made
void: And that no Member of the said Army shall receive any Damage,
Prejudice, or Reproach, for any thing in the said former Declaration. 163

The Rump Parliament that reconvened in 1659, and the Convention
Parliament of 1660 that followed it, significantly enlarged the practice of
expurgation. Several parliamentary committees were appointed to review
the Journal entries of the Long Parliament in their entirety and “make
Report of what they shall think fit to be expunged thereout, as treasonable,
and scandalous to his Majesty, and his Royal Father, of blessed Memory.”164
These Committees, which were established in 1659,165 1661,166 and 1685,167
were tasked with revising the official parliamentary record of the previous
twenty years to render it consistent with the constitutional values of the
Restoration. Significant procedural decisions were obliterated, including
Cromwell’s dissolution of Parliament (Henry Scobell, the Clerk of the Long
Parliament, was granted indemnity upon admitting he had entered the order
of dissolution in the Journal book)168; any orders mandating members of
Parliament to take the oath of “Engagement” under Cromwell169; a
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resolution of December 18, 1648, permitting members of the House of
Commons to dissent from a resolution of the House accepting Charles I’s
conditions for peace170; an order June 9, 1649 suspending members who
refused to dissent from the agreement to peace171; and orders permitting the
election of new members to replace those who were suspended.172 For good
measure, the Committee was also directed to investigate, “expunge and
obliterate” any “other Votes there are of this Nature; and report their
Opinion to the Parliament, Which of them they conceive fit to be
vacated.”173 During this period, Parliament used expurgation to resolve less
overtly political disputes as well. In Skinner’s Case, the House of Commons
challenged the House of Lord’s right to assume original jurisdiction in civil
suits and declared its adjudication of a suit against the East India Company
illegal. The dispute was resolved in consultation with Charles I, who
recommended that the Lords obliterate all records of its proceedings in the
case, which it did, effectively abandoning its jurisdictional claims.174
The purpose of expurgations was not to erase or manipulate the historical
record, but to provide a procedural method by which Parliament could void
the “precedents” on its records when those precedents were no longer
consistent with constitutional values. Expurgation did remove any reference
to an order from printed copies of Parliament’s Journals, aside from footnotes
indicating that an entry had been annulled.175 But as later historians have
discovered, clerks rarely attempted to erase previous legislative acts from the
original manuscript Journals in the parliamentary record. This was
demonstrated most prominently by a resolution of 1661 to reverse an act of
attainder passed by Parliament against the Earl of Strafford. Strafford had
been the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and was accused by the House of
Commons of conspiring with Charles I to raise a royalist army in Ireland to
suppress the parliamentary cause.176 After a failed impeachment for treason,
Commons and Lords passed a bill of attainder for treason against Strafford
in 1641. His subsequent execution was an important precipitating event in
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DIANE PURKISS, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 113–17 (2006) (describing Stafford’s trial and eventual
execution).
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the Civil War.177 In 1660, the House of Lords resolved to expunge the record
of Strafford’s attainder from its Journal books.178 The order of expurgation
vacated the act of attainder, and directed the clerk to physically erase it from
the manuscript Journals.179 Yet the House of Lords chose only to obliterate
the bill of attainder passed against Strafford—the actual parliamentary act
of condemnation—while leaving the records of the impeachment untouched.
Indeed, while the Restoration Parliament resolved to reverse the attainder
itself within a year of convening, it debated for over thirty-five years on
whether to expunge the impeachment proceedings from the Journal before
deciding against it.180 It was only in 1698 that the special committee of the
House of Lords concluded that “by former Orders made by this House,
relating to the cancelling and obliterating of the Earl’s Attainder, it could not
be intended that any other Proceedings should be obliterated than those
relating specially to the said Act of Attainder” and that:
[W]hatsoever stands crossed upon the Journals, relating to the Proceedings
of the Impeachment of the said Earl, ought not nor shall be looked on as
obliterated; and that the several Orders for obliterating and vacating any
Proceedings concerning the Earl of Strafford must be taken to have been
intended as to what related to the Act of Attainder only.181

These specifications insured that there would be no confusion as to
whether the procedural requirements for passing a bill of attainder had been
altered. More importantly, they emphasized the legal function of
expurgation—not to erase historical memory, but to amend the evolving
record of parliamentary law to indicate that a particular action of Parliament
was no longer valid, and that no future precedential use could be made of it.
Thus the “obliterated” attainder in the Lords manuscript Journal was not
actually erased, but only lightly crossed out, leaving “no difficulty in reading
every word.”182
A second development of this era was the decision to allow
parliamentarians to enter written dissents on the Journals. Like modern
judicial dissents, these entries registered MPs’ opposition to actions taken by
Parliament. Unlike other procedural innovations of the era, the practice of
dissenting was limited to only one house of Parliament, the House of Lords.
The tradition of entering individual protests on the Lords’ Journals began in
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4 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 238–40.
Paul Christianson, The ‘Obliterated’ Portions of the House of Lords Journals Dealing with the
Attainder of Strafford, 1641, 95 ENG. HIST. REV. 339, 339 (1980); see also A.S. Turberville, The
House of Lords under Charles II, 45 ENG. HIST. REV. 58, 71 (1930).
Christianson, supra note 179, at 339.
5 Jul. 1698, HL Jour. (1698).
Christianson, supra note 179, at 340 (quoting 9 S.R. GARDNER, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
ACCESSION OF JAMES I. TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR 1603–1642, at 355 n.1 (London,
Longmans, Green & Co. 1894)).
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the sixteenth century. Early protests were entered primarily in response to
religious measures taken under the Reformation,183 and were recorded in the
Journal simply as a list of the names of dissenting peers under the title
dissentientibus.184 But during the Long Parliament written dissents, giving
reasons for Lords’ disagreement with a legislative act, began to appear.
These entries were officially authorized in 1642 by a standing order “[t]hat
such Lords as shall make Protestation, or enter their Dissents, to any Votes
of this House, shall make their said Protestation, or give Directions to have
their Dissents entered into the Clerk’s Book.”185 It is noteworthy that the
House of Lords, where opposition to the Crown was much more equivocal
than in Commons, authorized this practice at the same moment that
Commons was perfecting the use of the ancient tradition of collective
protests, or remonstrances, to advance increasingly radical constitutional
arguments. The Commons explicitly denied its members the right of
entering individual protests in its Journals during its debate on the Grand
Remonstrance in 1641.186
A majority of peers frequently opposed the radical measures undertaken
by Commons during the political crisis of the 1640s.187 As a result, those
sympathetic to the parliamentary cause were forced to develop their own
procedural innovations to advance constitutional arguments in the upper
house, and to deny royalist peers the appearance of united opposition to the
Commons. The practice of dissenting reveals the extent to which
parliamentarians began to view their Journals not only as a procedural
record, but as a medium for constitutional dispute. For instance, in 1642,
the Commons proposed the Militia Bill, whereby they requested that Charles
I cede control of the Army to Parliament to suppress the uprising in Ireland.
The Lords, and ultimately Charles, rejected the bill, and the dispute over the
armed forces became one of the precipitating causes of the Civil War. One
of the first formal protests of the Lords was by a minority who dissented
against the Peers’ decision not to support the Commons’ request for control
of the army, a measure it called “absolutely necessary to the settling of
present distempers.”188 Many such protests were entered throughout the
eighteenth century, and the practice of protesting continued until well into
the twentieth.
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By the end of the seventeenth century, the Journals, as the living records
of Parliament’s actions and its interactions with the Crown, had become one
of the primary vehicles for structuring debate on the English constitution; the
form and functions of the legislature; and the distribution of governing power
within the state. The addition of new procedural mechanisms allowed
Parliament to adapt to the increased scope of its written precedent in this
period (through the use of committee review); changes in that precedent over
time (through the use of expurgation); and the existence of contemporaneous
disagreement among MPs on questions of constitutional importance
(through the entry of dissents in the Lords’ Journals). Of course, not every
question of parliamentary law could be given a definitive answer by
consulting Parliament’s records. Significant aspects of England’s governing
traditions are, as scholars commonly observe, “unwritten” and practiced
solely out of received tradition.189 And even where Parliament’s records did
serve as a source of legal authority, they were not necessarily the only source.
Sometimes the records confirmed the continuing validity of other external
documents, such as the Magna Carta. In other instances, rules or privileges
that were initially derived from Journal practice were later codified by
statute. Parliament’s records did inform many points of lex Parliamenti.
But more importantly, they defined Parliament as an institution that
makes and interprets constitutional law. Proving this capacity was critical to
establishing the legislature’s legitimacy as a governing institution, particularly
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the supreme sovereignty
of Parliament was first asserted. John Locke, for instance, discussed the
importance of a legislature that was itself governed by law in his Second Treatise
of Government, arguing that:
For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society,
as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by
established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their
duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers, too,
kept within their bounds.190

Blackstone, who resisted Locke’s appeals to popular sovereignty,191 also
believed that the law of Parliament promoted the legitimacy and stability of
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See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23–
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Blackstone replied that devolving sovereign power to the people would result in “dissolution of the
whole form of government established by that people,” and thus “annihilate[e] the sovereign
power” and “repeal[ ] all positive laws whatsoever before enacted,” making any permanent law
impossible. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142, *157. A society could only achieve
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the English government. He recognized that legislative authority that was
entirely unbounded by law posed a threat to just government, and that
British subjects would be “without remedy” if Parliament, “being the highest
and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the
kingdom,” should abuse its power “by any means” of “misgovernment.”192
Rules of Parliament’s own making could act as a restraint on the
legislature without subverting its sovereign authority, and constitutional
history proved that they had done so. The Journals provided the means by
which the “rulers” in Parliament demonstrated—to each other, to the
Crown, and, increasingly, to the public—that they were themselves governed
by the rule of law. “[A]s every court of justice hath laws and customs for it’s
[sic] direction,” Blackstone explained, “some the civil and canon, some the
common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs, so the high court
of parliament hath also it’s [sic] own peculiar law, called the lex et
consuetudo parliamenti”—a law that could best be learned “out of the rolls
of parliament, and other records, and by precedents, and continual
experience.”193
II. LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION
A. The Status of Journals in the Colonial Era
Americans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inherited
traditional British understandings of constitutionalism. They viewed the
“constitution” not as a single master-statement defining the law of
sovereignty, but as a collection of individual liberties and restraints on
state action that were grounded in historical precedent. Its contours
were gleaned from evidence of longstanding practice or prior agreements
between governing institutions. Such precedent endowed the exercise of
power with the legitimacy of consent—the Crown, the Parliament, or the
colonies were invested with a particular authority, because the historical
record proved that all of the stakeholders in the legal system had previously
recognized that liberty or authority as rightful. By the eighteenth century,
this understanding began to assume the familiar aspects of the theory of
government by contract or consent.194 Some legal authorities viewed the
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“constitution” in purely descriptive terms—it was, literally, the collection of
common law and institutional precedent that constituted the government,
and it could be altered as new sovereign agreements superseded previous
ones.195 Others—particularly American and English Whigs—viewed it in
more normative terms, as a governing order that was derived from historical
precedents, but that ultimately reflected the dictates of natural
law.196 But Americans generally agreed that the limits of what the
government could do were determined by evidence of what it had done in
the past.
As a result of this widespread emphasis on historical precedent, in the
colonial era arguments in constitutional law, like arguments in common law,
often reasoned by analogy from past historical practice to resolve
contemporary disputes over sovereign power. John Reid has labeled this
form of argument “forensic” history.197 The resolution of specific disputes
sounding in tort or contract were thought to reveal the general principles by
which the common law operated. Under what Coke dubbed the “artificial
reason”198 of the law, as one recent article has summarized:
[The legal practitioner would] perceive[ ] a relevant similarity between the
situation involved in some previous decision and the situation at issue in the
instant case, and then use[ ] the analogy between the previous decision and
the instant case to argue that the instant case ought to be decided in the same
way as the previous one.”199

In the same way, the resolution of disputes over individual rights or
sovereign authority were thought to reveal more generally applicable
doctrines of the law of government. The American colonists were, for
instance, aggressive in opposing the relatively minor taxes that Parliament
enacted in the early 1760s, not primarily because of the law’s onerous terms,
but because they feared that by acquiescing they would be deemed by
extension to have ratified the general legitimacy of parliamentary laws
enacted without colonial representation. As one American opponent of an
excise tax on cider argued in 1763, “if this new extension of the Excise-laws
is confirmed, it must effectually justify and authorise every future extension
of them which can be proposed, till the Excise becomes general.”200
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(2004).
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Prohibitions Del Roy (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343; 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65 (quoted in Frederick
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Likewise, two years later Attorney General Charles Yorke argued that the
Stamp Act was a “precedent” which “may . . . be in argument extended far,
to other future taxes, upon the colonies.”201 “That,” as Reid explains, “was
one reason American whigs rioted—to keep the Act from becoming a
precedent.”202 The knowledge that discrete political acts could serve as the
basis for general propositions of constitutional law strongly affected legal
thinking. Lawyers and political advocates thus frequently deployed historical
arguments in the service of a legal agenda.203
A number of legal historians have explored the importance of precedent
in early American law.204 But in examining how precedent was interpreted,
they have often overlooked the corollary question of how and why it was
generated in the first place. The accumulation of precedent was not a passive
process. While historical precedent generally was accorded greater
importance in the eighteenth century than it is today, the law placed a special
emphasis on written documents. “Like all Englishmen,” writes Gordon
Wood, “the colonists were familiar with written documents as barriers to
encroaching power.”205 And of all of the forms of written precedent, those
that came from institutions invested with sovereign power—such as
legislatures, courts, and the Crown and its executive officers—carried the
greatest weight. Moses Mather summarized the importance colonists
accorded to the written agreements whereby Parliament had reduced royal
authority, “[a]nxious to preserve and transmit” their rights “unimpaired to
posterity,” the English people had repeatedly “caused them to be reduced to
writing, and in the most solemn manner to be recognized, ratified and
confirmed,” by the Crown, and “afterwards by a multitude of corroborating
acts” culminating in the English Bill of Rights and the Acts of Settlement.206
Governing institutions understood this dynamic. Not just courts, but
legislatures and executive officials, were aware that the documents that had
the greatest persuasive weight in constitutional argument were those that
they generated in the course of their official duties. The statements that they
issued protesting or acceding to an assertion of authority by a coordinate
department; the portions of their records that they relied on in legal debates;
and the portions that they deliberately expunged—these things shaped the
universe of historical precedents that lawyers could rely on in pressing
constitutional arguments. The constitution changed as the written sources
of legal authority changed. As the English legal theorist Thomas Rutherford
201
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wrote in the 1750s, “[w]hatever constitution . . . might appear from former
usage to have been established in any civil society,” a “different or contrary
usage, after it obtains, will afford the same evidence, that the governors and
the people have mutually agreed to change the constitution.”207 By
controlling the contents of their historical records, these institutions could
exert considerable influence over the direction of constitutional debate.208
Record-keeping practices determined which historical precedents existed
and which of those continued to be recognized and relied upon by the
constituent elements of the state. Just as modern courts are strategic in
drafting opinions, aware that the legal conclusions they place on the judicial
record will be applied to a wide array of future disputes, so were the AngloAmerican governmental institutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries strategic in composing their official records.209 Compilers were
guided by a combination of constitutional values, institutional goals, and
political concerns in determining what their official records did—and did
not—say.
Legislative Journals were particularly important to the process of
precedent creation in America, beginning in the colonial era. There were
two reasons for this. First, the legislature had gained considerable theoretical
and practical significance in Anglo-American government. In England,
Parliament had largely established its supremacy.210 As a result of its
unequaled legal and political authority, the constructions it placed on issues
of constitutional law carried unique weight. It was, if not the only interpreter
of the constitution, at least the most important. Legislatures had outsized
importance in the colonies as well. They were the primary representatives
of local colonial populations within the imperial government.211 They also
took responsibility for many aspects of political administration, enacting local
laws and adjudicating legal disputes.212 Because colonial legislatures were
responsible for most of the daily administration of American affairs, their
records, like those of medieval Parliaments, had a practical importance that
made them difficult for the royal authorities to ignore. By the seventeenth
century many assemblies began to view themselves as colonial analogues of
Parliament—endowed with the same constitutional legitimacy to make and
207
208
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interpret law within their localized jurisdictions as Parliament was in
England. As the lower house of the Maryland Assembly expressed on its
record in 1697, it was “in like nature to the Parliament of England as to this
province.”213 Second, colonial assemblies inherited the legislative recordkeeping practices that had developed in England since the thirteenth century,
which enabled them to build and manage precedent with much greater
sophistication. All of the assemblies kept Journals after the parliamentary
tradition, and by the early eighteenth century the form and procedure for
recording them had become relatively formalized.214
Much like early Parliaments, colonial assemblies quickly learned that by
strategically managing their historical records, they could actively direct the
evolution of institutional relationships in government. Colonies often
leveraged their Journals to interpret their powers and privileges in ways that
significantly expanded their autonomy. The relationship between colonial
assemblies and royal governors, the Crown’s appointed administrators on
the American continent, was not well defined when the colonies were first
chartered. While colonial legislatures understood themselves as continental
analogues of Parliament, and governors as extensions of the Crown, in theory
by the eighteenth century the governors wielded much greater executive
authority in America than the monarch did in English domestic affairs.
Royal governors had the right to prorogue colonial assemblies at will, a
power that had been severely limited in England by the Glorious Revolution
and the Triennial and Septennial Acts; the Crown still enjoyed an unfettered
veto over colonial legislation; and royal governors still retained the right to
appoint and remove colonial judges at will.215
As early as the seventeenth century, colonial assemblies made concerted
efforts to import the doctrines of parliamentary privilege that had emerged
in England into American legislative practice, and to record and refine those
precedents in their Journals in order to bolster their legal rights against the
incursions of the royal government.
Many began imitating the
parliamentary practice of having the Speaker petition for recognition of the
body’s privileges—freedom of speech, access to the governor, and freedom
from arrest—at the beginning of each session and recording the petition on
the Journal.216 Colonies enforced these privileges as well and recorded their
assertions in Journals. In South Carolina, in 1701, for example, a member
of the South Carolina assembly insulted the royal governor during a debate
on an admiralty bill. The governor dissolved the debate in retaliation, and
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the assembly formally protested on its Journal that the dissolution was a
violation of its freedom of speech, which was “their undoubted right.”217
Freedom from arrest was asserted more aggressively, as most colonies
enacted this freedom as a positive statute, rather than relying exclusively on
Journal precedent.218 But here, too, Journals still played an important role.
In several colonies, including Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Jamaica,
assemblies later expounded the statutory protection from arrest by voting for
resolutions which formally defined its contours.219 More importantly,
colonial assemblies continued to exercise the traditional authority that
Parliament had to define and punish breaches of this privilege through
formal, quasi-judicial proceedings.220 The right to exercise this authority,
and the procedures by which it was exercised, were derived from
parliamentary practice and from the assemblies’ own Journal precedents.221
Assemblies also developed legislative precedent that enabled them to expand
their jurisdiction to governmental functions that had historically rested with
royal governors, including determining the time and duration of sittings, the
appointment of judges, and (critically) control of finances.222
Yet the colonists’ relationship with Journal precedent was not merely
opportunistic. To the extent that they viewed themselves as replicas of the
English Parliament, endowed with the same rights and privileges, they also
understood their Journals to embody a coherent doctrine of parliamentary
law. Colonial lawyers and legislators were well acquainted with the English
doctrine of lex Parliamenti.223 Through the publication of scholarly English
treatises (which were enabled by the professionalization of parliamentary
staff and the renewed institutional focus on records in the seventeenth
century), Americans became familiar with the extensive body of Journal
precedent that had developed since the middle ages. Thomas Jefferson, who
served as the Clerk of the Virginia House of Burgesses, relied extensively on
Hatsell—whose compendium of parliamentary Journal precedents he
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described as “preeminent”—as well as Elsynge and a host of other English
authorities to develop his understanding of legislative law and procedure.224
The keeping of Journals also enabled assemblies to conceptualize
themselves as adjudicative bodies, that not only made positive law but acted
collectively to interpret and apply legal concepts. Colonial assemblies played
a crucial role in adjudicating private legal disputes, acting (as medieval
Parliament did) as a court of law that resolved cases through the application
of precedent.225 While not every private petition for relief was recorded in
colonial Journals, the most prominent were.226 Assemblies also played an
important role in adjudicating disputes over public law, including monetary
claims against colonial governments. Here, too, Journals helped establish a
new area of legislative jurisdiction and conditioned the legislature to behave
as a body that created and applied legal precedent. Christine Desan has
examined the example of New York, whose colonial assembly extensively
adjudicated citizens’ claims for government compensation in the eighteenth
century. As Desan notes, New York “did not simply inherit adjudicative
authority,” but rather “had to invent that authority” by constructing
precedent.227 Thus, “[t]he formulaic entries in the assembly Journals
[adjudicating public claims] and in the official rhythms of the statutes
[awarding compensation] reveal starkly the constitutional innovations that
brought the legislature its jurisdiction to determine public claims.”228 For the
historian reviewing New York’s colonial legislative record, “the shape of
government itself suddenly fills the pages of the assembly Journal. The claims
discussed . . . tell the story of everyday administration,” and “reveal the
public activity of the province, outlining the areas on which its officials spent
money.”229
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Moreover, while the seventeenth century had seen the most significant
use of parliamentary records to resolve constitutional questions, Journal
disputes continued to occur in England in the eighteenth century and to
capture the attention of the American public. The case of John Wilkes, MP
for Middlesex, was the most prominent of these. Wilkes had won his seat in
Commons in 1768, but the House subsequently declared him ineligible on
the basis of certain allegedly libelous articles he had published years earlier
which had offended George III and his allies in Parliament. The controversy
pit competing theories of legislative power (Josh Chafetz has labelled these
“Blackstonian,” for William Blackstone, and “Millian,” for John Stuart Mill)
against each other. 230 Traditional theories of parliamentary rights, which
viewed the authority of Parliament over its own proceedings as absolute and
inviolable, supported the right of Commons to exclude Wilkes for any reason
it deemed proper. Blackstone defended the House’s right to exclude Wilkes
as not only “evident from precedents,” but “clear from reason,” because “it
would expose the judicature of the house of commons to the most flagrant
insult and contempt . . . if the member expelled to-day, should be forced
upon it to-morrow.”231 More modern theories, influenced by increasingly
popular norms of electoral accountability, held that Parliament could not
exercise its privileges in a manner that was subversive of democratic rights.
Edmund Burke warned against granting Parliament uncontrolled power
over seating members, arguing that “all men possessed of an uncontrolled
power leading to the aggrandizement and profit of their own body have
always abused it.”232
Following a public campaign lasting six years (in which some sixty
thousand subjects petitioned the Crown on his behalf), Wilkes was finally
seated in Parliament in 1774.233 In 1782, he succeeded in having the House
resolution declaring him ineligible expunged from the House of Commons
Journal “as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this
kingdom.”234 The Wilkes case became a cause célèbre among American
Whigs, themselves chafing at what they perceived as the overbearing exercise
of parliamentary authority. “Wilkes and Liberty” was a popular rallying
cry.235 William Palfrey, member of Boston Sons of Liberty and associate of
John Hancock, wrote to Wilkes in 1768 that the colonies desired ministers of
the Crown who were “reverenced and loved by the people,” and for
enlightened members of Parliament, and hoped that Wilkes would be one
such member.236 The extensive use that both sides made of Journal
precedent in adjudicating the controversy, and the effort Wilkes himself
230
231
232
233
234
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CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 156–58.
CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 158.
CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 157.
See CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 156–58; 3 REID, supra note 194, at 22–26.
22 William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England 1411 (T.C. Hansard ed., 1814).
Arthur H. Cash & John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty 231–32 (2006).
Id. at 233.
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made in having the prior judgment of the House expunged from the Journals
to formalize his legal victory, reflects the continued prominence of legislative
Journals in constitutional discourse during the eighteenth century.
B. Drafting the Journal Clause
The drafting of the Journal Clause at the Philadelphia Convention
solidified the importance of legislative Journals as law-producing documents
and reinforced their status within the hierarchy of government records.
Article I sought to achieve apparently conflicting goals. Responding to the
failures of the Articles of Confederation, it endeavored to craft a national
legislature that was both sufficiently powerful and sufficiently independent to
carry into execution the state-building agenda of a larger and more
centralized federal government; and that was also confident enough in its
constitutional authority to check incursions by competing branches of
government.237 At the same time, Article I also attempted to ensure that the
national legislature was sufficiently governed by rules and democratic norms
that it did not become overweening or tyrannical—an increasingly urgent
concern by the late 1780s, when state legislatures had come to be seen by
many as dangerous instruments of populist rule.238
The Journal Clause responded to both concerns. With respect to the
need for a more muscular and constitutionally assertive legislative branch,
the clause served to codify a tradition of precedential recordkeeping that had
been one of the primary tools of both Parliament and the colonial legislatures
in wresting legal authority from the Crown. Because of the Framers’ broad
familiarity with the history of Journal-keeping practice, and its role in
constitutional development, many of the specifics of the provision were
borrowed from existing record-keeping traditions with minimal
disagreement. The Articles of Confederation contained a provision
mandating the regular publication of legislative proceedings that served as a
model.239 So, too, did many state constitutions.240 Debate on the text of the
new clause thus focused on relatively narrow procedural questions, most of
237
238

239
240

See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 185, at 544–47.
WOOD, supra note 185, at 404–09 (describing state legislatures’ abuses of authority in the eighteenth
century); WOOD, supra note 185, at 522–23 (describing the Founders’ fear of similar excesses by
Congress).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. VII, § 7.
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, art. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XV; PA. CONST. of 1776,
§ 14; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV. States legislatures whose constitutions did not explicitly
require them to keep journals still did, continuing the colonial practice. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA (Samuel Shepard & Co. eds., 1828) (1776),
https://archive.org/details/journalofhouseof1776virg; see also Early State Records Online, MD. ST.
ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/html/all.html (last
visited May 1, 2019) (listing archives copies of the Journals of the Maryland Senate and House of
Delegates from 1777 onward).
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which focused on ensuring that the Journals were sufficiently succinct.241
Indeed, perhaps the most significant fact about the Journal Clause of Article I
is that it was included in the Constitution at all. No other branch of
government was similarly required to produce a record of its proceedings.
Article III, for instance, contains no equivalent mandate that judicial courts
produce procedural records or publish opinions. The explicit incorporation
of a legislative record-keeping requirement into the Constitution’s final text
reflects the particular importance accorded Journals at the time; an attitude
that is consistent with the primacy of the legislature in the political theory of
late eighteenth-century America.242
Consistent with the goal of empowering Congress to keep and publish its
own records with minimal external restraints, the Journal Clause also
loosened restrictions imposed by the Articles of Confederation. The Articles
had required Congress to publish its proceedings monthly. They had also
strictly circumscribed the legislature’s power to make redactions: only those
portions of the legislative record relating to “treaties, alliances or military
operations” could be withheld.243 Article I eliminated both restrictions: the
new Congress was required only to publish its proceedings “from time to
time;” and it could redact any portions of the record which, “in its
discretion,” required secrecy.244 Unlike other portions of the Journal Clause,
these changes did inspire controversy, both at the Philadelphia Convention
and at the state ratifying conventions. George Mason argued that a blanket
allowance for Congress to withhold portions of its Journals at its own
discretion would turn the legislature into a “conclave.”245 James Wilson
likewise argued that the “people have a right to know what their Agents are
doing or have done,” and that therefore Congress should have no option to
keep its Journals secret.246 There were also objections in both the Virginia,247
and the North Carolina ratifying conventions to the absence of a strict
timetable for publishing records248 Patrick Henry called the “provision for
periodical publication . . . too inexplicit and ambiguous,” and worried that,
without a strict mandate to publish their proceedings, Congress could “carry
on the most wicked and pernicious schemes under the dark veil of secrecy.”249
The most forceful response to these objections was made by James Madison,
241
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These debates, which focused on questions such as the quorum required to record a vote, are found
in the published records of the Constitutional Convention. See 2 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, 256 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
See supra Section II.A; see also WOOD, supra note 194, at 162–63.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VII, § 7.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
CHAFETZ, supra note 65, at 52.
CHAFETZ, supra note 65, at 52.
3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 315–
16 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates].
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, 72–73.
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 169–70.
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who argued during the Virginia ratifying convention that relaxing these
restrictions merely vested Congress with the same authority as the House of
Commons and the majority of state legislatures—both of which had wide
discretion regarding the publication and redaction of their records.250 While
Madison did not dispute the potential danger of political secrecy—a concern
that had been raised periodically throughout the drafting and ratification
process251—he contended that the traditional norms of legislative
recordkeeping would prevent abuse. “There was,” he explained, “never any
legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing important
transactions, the publication of which might be detrimental to the
community. There can be no real danger as long as the government is
constructed on such principles.”252
But despite the greater discretion it conferred on Congress to compile
and publish its own records, the Journal Clause also implicitly addressed the
need to construct a national legislature bound by rules. In order to ensure
legislative independence, Article I had granted Congress sole authority over
several important areas of governance. Section 5, for instance, authorized
each House to determine the rules of its own proceedings, and to punish or
expel its members for violations.253 That Section also made Congress the
judge of its own elections, and the returns and qualifications of its
members.254 Section 2 permitted each House to choose its Speakers and
other officers.255 Sections 2 and 3 designated the House of Representatives
and the Senate as having the sole power to initiate and try impeachments,
respectively, and also authorized each house to select its own officers.256
These provisions largely codified rights that Parliament and the colonial
assemblies had won as a precedential matter by the eighteenth century, after
extended legal struggles.257 As the attempts of the Stuarts and earlier
monarchs to manipulate the procedures by which legislation was enacted
demonstrated, a legislature’s power over the rules of its proceedings was an
essential element of its political independence.258 Likewise, the role of the
Crown in selecting Speakers and other legislative officers had long been a
means of undermining the autonomy of Parliament and American legislative
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3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 409.
See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 315–16 (Patrick Henry detailing dangers of political
secrecy).
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 409.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cls. 1, 2.
Id. cl. 1.
Id. § 2, cl. 5.
See id. (granting the House of Representatives the “sole Power of Impeachment”); id. § 3, cl. 6
(granting the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments”).
See supra Part I.
See supra Section I.C.
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assemblies.259 Impeachment was perhaps the most powerful weapon
legislatures possessed against the “evil ministers” of the Executive.260
Affirming that Congress had sole authority in these areas was thus essential
to stabilizing a system of separated powers.
Yet these functions were also important components of a representative
democracy. As Locke and Blackstone had expressed reservations about the
unlimited sovereignty of Parliament in the eighteenth century, so Americans
worried that granting Congress unchecked authority to determine the
process by which laws were made, impeachments were tried, or legislators
were seated risked permitting the legislature to behave arbitrarily.261 There
was no black-letter provision of the Constitution that ensured that Congress
would discharge these duties in a manner that was generally accepted as
consistent with republican values. The Journal Clause provided a solution
to this difficulty, because it continued the well-established English and
colonial practice of recording and compiling the precedents of legislative
procedure in a legally binding government record. And as the Wilkes case
had recently demonstrated, written precedent could serve not only to
advance the legislature’s interests against the Crown, but also to ensure that
the legislature itself remained bounded by legal norms—that, as Locke had
explained, the “rulers” were “kept within their due bounds.”262 Indeed, as
legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic had grown more powerful in the
eighteenth century, ensuring that those bodies were bounded by rules of
fairness and procedure took on even greater political importance.263 Patrick
Henry’s fear that Congress might carry on “pernicious schemes” if it were
not forced to disclose its proceedings, and James Wilson’s demand that the
public know what its “Agents were doing or have done” reflected an anxiety
among the founding generation that a legislature unbounded by transparent
and widely accepted rules of procedure was liable to become abusive.
The drafters of the Constitution and early legislators considered the
Journals of the House and Senate to import existing precedents of
parliamentary law from England and from the colonial assemblies into
congressional practice. Thomas Jefferson drafted a manual of legislative
procedure for the Senate—a version of which governed questions of Senate
procedure until the 1970s,264 and still governs questions of House
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See supra Sections I.A & I.C. For a discussion of the role gubernatorial patronage played in checking
the power of colonial legislatures, see BAILYN, supra note 211, at 72–80.
See supra Sections I.A & I.C.
For a discussion of anxieties about legislative supremacy in the colonial and early republican era,
see 3 REID, supra note 194, at 71–84, 301; WOOD, supra note 194, at 404–09.
LOCKE, supra note 190, at 72–73.
WOOD, supra note 194, at 404–09 (describing state legislatures’ abuses of authority in the eighteenth
century).
JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at xiii–xiv.
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procedure265 for issues on which it has not been explicitly superseded—that
structured much of the institution’s early rules, and that was adopted almost
entirely from Hatsell’s compendium of precedents from parliamentary
Journals.266 The surviving writings of John James Beckley, the influential first
Clerk of the House of Representatives and a confidant of Jefferson, likewise
indicate a belief that Congress would be governed by the history of
parliamentary practice. Beckley was well read in the major treatises on
British parliamentary procedure, including Coke and Hatsell,267 and in an
unpublished treatise on legislative procedure he reviewed “the jurisdiction &
power of Parliament” in order to derive the “general principles” of legislative
law, and apply them to “the specified & enumerated powers of Congress”
and “the general nature and design of those Legislative and judicial functions
with the execution of which, it is entrusted, as the supreme power of the
Union.”268
In addition, the Journals provided the means for Congress to adopt new
precedents where prior practice did not provide adequate guidance. Both
the House and the Senate understood that the proceedings recorded in their
Journals would themselves assume precedential effect on disputed questions
of procedure.269 The establishment of a fixed system of rules lent order and
legitimacy to congressional proceedings. Like Parliament, both Houses of
Congress directed their clerical staff to take special care to ensure their
265
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RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 1030–31 (2015); see also
id. at 127 n.1 (noting that Jefferson’s Manual has controlled House procedure unless explicitly
contradicted since 1837). The House version omits portions of the Manual that refer exclusively to
Senate or procedure or the procedures of Parliament. Id.
JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at xxviii.
JOHN JAMES BECKLEY, JUSTIFYING JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN JAMES
BECKLEY 142–46 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1995) (recounting Beckley essay referencing British
parliamentary procedure); see also Edmund S. Berkeley & Dorothy S. Berkeley, “The Ablest Clerk in
the U.S.”: John James Beckley, 70 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 434, 436 (1962) (discussing Beckley’s
early English legal education); Noble E. Cunningham, John Beckley: An Early American Party Manager,
13 WM. & MARY Q. 40, 40 (1956) (discussing Beckley’s experience as a clerk in various legislatures).
BECKLEY, supra note 267, at 144.
The use of record precedents to resolve disputes of procedure has continued to the present day.
Former Clerk Asher Hinds, in his definitive treatment of procedure in the House of Representatives
in 1907, wrote in the introduction to his treatise that “[t]he value of precedents in guiding the action
of a legislative body had been demonstrated by the experience of the House of Representatives for
too many years to justify any arguments in their favor now.” ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES iii (1907); see also 6
CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v (1935)
(recognizing the influence of Hinds’ Precedents). The Senate’s compendium of procedure, written
by former Parliamentarian Floyd Riddck, likewise relies on Journal precedent to articulate many
of the rules of legislative practice. See FLOYD M. RIDDICK, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE:
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES xv (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992) (“These rulings and opinions extend
over a long period of time and were made by many different Presiding Officers-some going back
almost to the very first session of the Senate. The Senate portions of the Congressional Record and the
Senate Journal, for the period from December 3, 1883, to date, have been perused for rulings by
Presiding Officers and practices which relate to Senate procedure.”).
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accuracy. Journal entries could be made or changed only at the formal
direction of the relevant house, and their contents were strictly controlled.270
By providing a formal mechanism by which the legislature could both consult
historical precedent, and, where necessary, establish new legal and
procedural rules, Journals lent structure to an area of government that the
Constitution had left underdetermined.
C. Journals in the Early Republic
Legal historians in recent decades have revived the study of the early
republican theory of constitutional interpretation known as
“departmentalism.”271 The Founding generation anticipated that where an
ambiguity existed in constitutional doctrine, all three federal departments
(and, under some versions of this theory, the states as well) would participate
in constructing governing precedent. The courts enjoyed no legal monopoly
on constitutional interpretation. As James Madison asserted in 1789:
“[There is no ‘one department’ that] draws from the constitution greater
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the several
departments. . . . If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into
270

271

The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate was “the sworn recording officer of the
assembly,” and, like the Clerks of Parliament who were forbidden from making entries at the
entreaties of individual legislators, was “subject only to the control of the assembly itself, and not to
the control of the presiding officer, or of any other member.” See LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING,
LEX PARLIAMENTIA AMERICANA: ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 169 (2d ed. 1859). House rules specifically
charged that “clerk is to let no journals, records, accounts, or papers be taken from the table, or out
of his custody.” JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at 25. This care ensured that Congress’s records, and
the constitutional precedents reflected in them, would command respect from both the public and
the coordinate branches of government. In contrast to emerging newspaper reports of legislative
debates, which often provided detailed transcriptions of floor speeches, the contents of the Journals
were intentionally spare. See infra Part III (describing the rise of the transcripts of debate in the early
nineteenth century, and their eventual displacement of the Journals as the preeminent records of
legislative activity). They recorded only the votes, attendance, resolutions, and official messages
exchanged by either house— the official acts undertaken by the House and Senate as collective
bodies, which could be used by the institutions as precedent for future institutional conduct.
See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 108–11 (2004) (describing the “departmental theory” of the early Republic, in which
“[e]ach branch could express its views as issues came before it in the ordinary course of business . .
. [b]ut none of the branches’ views were final or authoritative”); see also LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) (arguing that
“constitutional law is not a monopoly of the judiciary,” but rather “a process in which all three
branches con-verge and interact with their separate interpretations”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 232–33 (1994)
(describing the belief, articulated in the Federalist Papers, that “one-branch interpretative
supremacy” was undesirable, and that “each department should have a will of its own” by “being
made independent of other departments”); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority
of the Judiciary’s Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771, 777 (1994) (noting that
“executive officials” have “frequently advocated departmentalism as opposed to judicial
supremacy” from “the earliest days of the republic until the present day”).
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question, I do not see that any one of these independent departments has
more right than another to declare their sentiments on that point.” 272

While courts asserted the right to review statutes and other state actions
for constitutionality, they exercised this jurisdiction only rarely in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.273 Moreover, even when courts
did interpret the constitution, they rarely espoused the more radical doctrine
of judicial supremacy, i.e., that judicial interpretations were binding on other
departments.274 In the ordinary course of government, the early Constitution
relied on multiple institutional interpreters to give it construction.
Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of what these
non-judicial constitutional interpretations looked like in daily practice, how
they were formulated, and what legal authority they had. The history of
legislative Journals demonstrates that constitutional interpretation by the
coordinate branches was more than a theoretical possibility in the early years
of the republic. Republicans in particular emphasized the importance of
Congress, viewing constitutional interpretation by an elective assembly as an
important corrective to the aristocratic and centralizing impulses of the
judicially-oriented Federalists.275 As John Randolph of Virginia protested
during the debate to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, “are we [in Congress]
not as deeply interested in the true exposition of the Constitution as the
judges can be? With all the deference to their talents, is not Congress as
capable of forming a correct opinion as they are?”276 The pre-1787 history
of legislative records provided a ready-made framework for Congress to
deliberate upon questions of law, and to build an authoritative body of
precedent. Congress not only had an equal right to interpret the
Constitution, it also had an array of well-established, time-tested institutional
tools with which to do so. The records that it managed as part of its daily
proceedings allowed it to register its interpretations of constitutional law, and
to respond to the interpretations asserted by other branches, as both
Parliament and the colonial assemblies had done before it.
Indeed, because of the active role that legislatures had historically played
in contributing to constitutional doctrine, not only Congress but the other
branches considered legislative constitutionalism to be a natural feature of
the tripartite system of government. Competing interpretations of
constitutional law, memorialized in parallel government records, could lead
to the sorts of procedural disputes that characterized seventeenth century
England and colonial American politics. But in the ordinary course of early
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KRAMER, supra note 195, at 105–06.
KRAMER, supra note 195, at 147–48 (discussing how rarely judicial review was implemented).
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republican government, departmental interpretations of the constitution
were often complimentary rather than conflicting. Congress, for instance,
took care in its early records to memorialize its respect for the prerogatives
of other branches. In 1806, William Smith, an admiral and Revolutionary
War veteran, and Samuel G. Ogden, a New York ship owner, submitted an
unusual petition to Congress. Ogden and Smith had been arrested for
violation of the 1794 Neutrality Act277 after Smith had been captured by the
Spanish Navy while bound for Venezuela with men and weapons on a ship
owned by Ogden. The men claimed that they had been secretly encouraged
by President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison to provide
assistance to Francisco de Miranda in his war for independence against
Spain, charges which Jefferson and Madison denied.278
While their prosecution was pending in New York, they submitted a
petition to Congress alleging that they had been acting under executive
orders from the President and “praying such relief [ ] as the wisdom of
Congress might think proper to grant.”279 A number of congressmen viewed
the petition as an attempt to implicate the President in a secret military plot
on the Journals of Congress, and as an improper request for Congress to
interfere in an ongoing trial. Nathan Williams of New York claimed that the
petitions were an attempt, “by obtaining the sanction of the House of their
contents, to throw blame and censure on the prosecutors.” 280 The petitions,
claimed Williams, were “of a most dangerous tendency” both because they
implied the possibility of Congress interfering in a judicial proceeding, and
because they would “tend to incense not only the country against the
Administration, but against the tribunals of justice.”281 After a lengthy
debate, the House entered a resolution declaring that the memorials were
“presented at a time and under circumstances insidiously calculated to excite
unjust prejudice . . . against the existing Administration,” and thus directing
“that the said memorials be by the Clerk of this House returned to those from
whom they came” and expunged from the Journals.282 The resolution thus
adopted the ancient parliamentary practice of expurgation—of annulling the
precedential effect of a Journal entry—in order to ensure that Congress’s
records accurately reflected the constitutional boundaries between the
coordinate branches.
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18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994).
See generally United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1086 (1806).
Id.
Id.
Id. The resolution passed by a large margin. Id. at 1094.
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Similar instances in which Congress omitted or erased entries thought to
impugn the prerogatives of other departments occurred throughout the early
republican era. In 1818, for instance, Vincente Pazos, who purported to be
an agent of the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, submitted a petition
to Congress seeking compensation for property damage suffered by
inhabitants of Amelia Island, which had recently been annexed by the
United States. The Executive had already rejected similar requests and had
not yet formally recognized either government.
The House of
Representatives voted to refuse to receive the petition, as it appeared to be a
request for Congress to grant implicit recognition on its formal records to
governments that the Executive had not yet recognized, and also to reverse
an Executive decision on compensating foreign nationals. As John Rhea of
Tennessee summarized, “[t]he Constitution had given this business to the
Executive—this House had nothing to do with it; and he did not wish to
encourage appeals, either to the people or this House, from the Executive by
any foreign agent.”283 In instances such as these, Congress utilized its
Journals not to wrest power from coordinate branches, but to formally
reaffirm its respect for their constitutional prerogatives, establishing the
comity necessary for departmental interpretation to function properly.
Courts, in turn, recognized Congress’s authority to reason as a lawinterpreting body. The most significant example of this dynamic was the
recognition of Congress’s right to hold non-members in contempt. The
congressional power of contempt, which is not explicitly granted by Article I,
is traditionally traced to the Supreme Court’s holding in Anderson v. Dunn in
1821.284 But while Anderson did recognize Congress’s inherent power to
punish contempt, this recognition was not so much a legal innovation as an
adoption of existing constitutional doctrine established by congressional
precedent. Parliament had exercised the right to hold non-members in
contempt, as had most colonial and state legislatures.285 Congress first
asserted the same authority in 1795, when members of the House of
Representatives accused two private citizens, Robert Randall and Charles
Whitney, of attempting to bribe them in exchange for land development
rights in Michigan.286 The House, at the urging of William Smith of South
283
284
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286

31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1258 (1818).
19 U.S. 204, 204 (1821). For modern authorities tracing the power of contempt to Anderson, see for
example, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 204) (“The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority
is, as the Court points out, rooted in history. It has been acknowledged by this Court since 1821.”).
In 1857, Congress enacted a statute, Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 14, 11 Stat. 155, establishing
contempt as a criminal offense punishable by judicial process. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 216
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting this enactment).
See CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 193–206 (providing a history of the use of contempt powers and the
theories supporting their use).
See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 166–95 (1795) (providing an account of Congressional action taken in
response to bribery attempts).
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Carolina, resolved to formally claim the ancient parliamentary prerogative
for itself. Smith explained:
As every jurisdiction had certain powers necessary for its preservation, so the
Legislature possessed certain privileges incident to its nature, and essential
for its very existence. This is called in England the parliamentary law; and
as from that law are derived the usages and proceedings of the several State
Legislatures, so will the proceedings of this House be generally guided by the
long-established usages of the State Legislatures. 287

Smith urged that Congress use its Journals to define the laws and
procedures governing its right of contempt, since neither the Constitution
nor the courts could supply the proper guidance. “This was the first instance,
since the organization of this Government,” Smith noted, “in which it had
been found necessary to resort to this high prerogative: it was right, therefore,
that the principles on which it was founded should be well understood, and
that the privileges of the House should stand unimpaired.”288 The
Committee on Privileges thus drafted a resolution, voted by the House,
which formally defined the mode of proceeding for the trial.289 Throughout,
the Journals served as the equivalent of a court record, listing formal charges
devised by the Committee on Privileges, as well as pleas, testimony, and the
judgment of the House.290
When John Anderson, likewise accused of attempted bribery, stood trial
for contempt in 1818, the House of Representatives relied heavily on the
precedent of Randall and Whitney to prosecute the case. The procedures
employed in 1795 were closely replicated.291 When several Republican
congressmen attacked the proceedings as unconstitutional, Federalists
replied that that the Congress had already considered and rejected these
arguments and established its right to hold non-members in contempt as a
matter of precedent. Joseph Hopkinson of Pennsylvania encapsulated the
Federalist position, explaining that the Republicans’ objection “had been
heretofore solemnly debated and adjudged; and all the objections now
expressed had been brought forward in their greatest force, without effect;
and the precedent then established was entitled to respect.”292 In the case of
Randall and Whitney, “it was well known a full opportunity was given for
the freest discussion; the parties arraigned at the bar having been heard by
their counsel on this question.”293 “In such cases,” Hopkinson concluded,
287
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Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 194–95.
See id. at 166–95 (listing specific charges brought by the Committee on Privileges).
As in the case of Randall and Whitney, the House adopted a resolution formally announcing the
charges and defining the mode of proceeding. Its contents substantially reproduced the procedure
established in 1795. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1818). The resolution is printed in the House
Journal. H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1818).
15 ANNALS OF CONG. 595–96 (1818).
Id. at 596.
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“we have ever been guided by precedent, and we have done right.”294
Charles Mercer of Virginia gave an even more forceful defense of the power
of Congressional precedent. Mercer said:
It has been correctly said that the multiplicity of laws constitutes the security
of the citizen. So, sir, does the multitude of precedents which, sanctioned by
usage, operate with the force of law. Precedents established in good times,
stay, in disastrous days, the rage of faction, and the hand of tyranny . . . .295

Even Republicans opposed to the congressional power of contempt
appeared to acknowledge the force of the Whitney and Randall precedent—
rather than urging the Congress to ignore it, several encouraged Congress to
explicitly overrule it instead. “If solitary precedents might be found on the
Journals of the exercise of such a power by the House,” urged Philemon
Beecher of Ohio, “it was time now to put a stop to it.” 296
When Anderson brought a trespass action against the Sergeant at Arms
of the House of Representatives for detaining him in connection with his
contempt proceeding (arguing that the detention was not authorized by law,
because Congress had no constitutionally sanctioned power to punish
contempt), he was in effect asking the court to overrule twenty years of settled
congressional precedent, which was based in turn on several centuries of
parliamentary practice. Much as Ogden or Pazos had done in Congress,
Anderson was asking the judiciary to invade the long-established prerogative
of a coordinate branch of government. The Supreme Court rejected
Anderson’s arguments, and in doing so employed reasoning that closely
mirrored that of Congress. It was true, the court conceded, that the
Constitution did not grant Congress the express power to punish contempt.
“But what,” the Court asked, “is the alternative? The argument obviously
leads to the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives
to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indignity and
interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against
it.”297 In response to Anderson’s argument that neither the Constitution nor
the coordinate branches provided any limitation on the contempt power, and
that as a result it was liable to be abused, the court replied that this was not
so. Congress’s power to punish was subject to limits—specifically, the limits
of precedent and legal reasoning. Congress could not stretch its authority to
punish beyond reason, because it was required to reason publicly and
accountable to the public for its judgments. The Court replied:
That a deliberate assembly clothed with the majesty of the people, and
charged with the care of all that is dear to them . . . whose deliberations are
required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the public, and

294
295
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Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 606.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821).
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whose decisions must be clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited
confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire, that such an assembly
should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a
supposition too wild to be suggested. 298

And these judgments were not to made from whole cloth. Rather, they
were to be derived (legally, analogically) from the powers established by long
usage, as revealed by the legislature’s records. The Court concluded:
[T]he Constitution is not a new creation, but a combination of existing
materials, whose properties and attributes were familiarly understood, and
had been determined by reiterated experiments. It is not, therefore,
reasoning upon things as they are, to suppose that any deliberative assembly,
constituted under it, would ever assert any other rights and powers than
those which had been established by long practice, and conceded by public
opinion.299

In short, the Court viewed Congress’s building of institutional law as
legitimate and complementary to the work of the judiciary—as establishing
reasoned government in areas of law where early courts rarely tread—rather
than as an intrusion on judicial power or civil liberty.
The tradition of legislative constitutionalism reached the height of its
development in the 1830s. While legislative Journals were important tools
in elucidating the contours of sovereign power, their contents were rarely
subject to the kind of bitter controversy that could capture the attention of
the entire legal or political community. Such disputes only occurred in times
of crisis when structural constitutional norms were challenged, and they
threw into sharp relief the usually hidden or subtle role that legislatures
played in constructing constitutional doctrine. The English Civil War was
one such period in history of the English Journals. The 1830s was another
for the Journals of Congress. During that decade, a series of conflicts over
issues ranging from nullification to slavery to the limits of Executive power
and Article I jurisdiction quickly escalated to the verge of political crisis.
Some of these disputes—nullification, for instance—played out as battles
between the states and the national government, but others were fought
within the federal government itself.300 In the era before the advent of
judicial supremacy, the federal courts were not always the only—or even the
most natural—department to resolve disputed points of constitutional law.
Under these circumstances, parties turned to the political branches for
formal, legal resolution. Two such disputes are of particular relevance here,
because they demonstrate the legal community’s consciousness of the
importance of formal legislative records as law-making documents through
the 1830s, as well as the continued vitality of formal record-keeping practices
as a method of constitutional adjudication: (1) the dispute between President
Jackson and the Senate over the right of the President to intentionally defund
298
299
300

Id. at 228–29.
Id. at 232.
KRAMER, supra note 195, at 178–82 (providing a summary of the criticism of judicial supremacy).
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the Second Bank of the United States; and (2) the dispute over the authority
of Congress to abolish slavery in federal territories.
1. Andrew Jackson and the “Bank War”
President Jackson’s opposition to the Second Bank of the United States,
which he believed to be an unconstitutional abuse of Congress’s legislating
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, is welldocumented.301 So, too, is his belief that each branch of government enjoyed
a co-equal right to execute the law according to its own interpretation of the
Constitution.302 These two components of Jackson’s political worldview
intersected in a bitter confrontation with Congress in 1832 over the rechartering of the bank. The bank’s 1816 federal charter was scheduled to
expire in 1836. Jackson’s opponents in Congress—chief among them Henry
Clay—had gathered enough support in both houses to pass a bill renewing
the bank’s charter that year, four years ahead of schedule and early enough
to place the bank at issue during Jackson’s reelection campaign. Congress
enacted the re-charter, forcing Jackson to either veto a widely popular
institution, which the Supreme Court had already declared in McCulloch v.
Maryland303 to be within the permissible scope of Congress’s Article I powers,
or sign the bill, surrendering on a key policy platform. Jackson vetoed it
nonetheless. In doing so, he issued arguably the most famous veto message
in American history, outlining his belief that he was constitutionally obligated
to veto the bank notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in
McCulloch.304 Following his reelection in 1832, Jackson took the more
aggressive step of defunding the bank before its charter expired. He ordered
Treasury Secretary Louis McLane to remove its deposits and transfer them
to various state-chartered institutions. When McLane refused, believing that
he was not authorized to do so under the terms of the charter, Jackson
summarily removed him from office, and replaced him with William Duane,
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Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1538 (1997) (citation omitted) (“Jackson hated the Bank with an
almost irrational vehemence, and he described it at times as a hydra-headed monster that impaired
the morals of the American people, corrupted their leaders, and threatened their liberty.”).
See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 195, at 189 (arguing that Jackson sought to “frustrate the court’s
judgment”).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819) (“The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct
sovereign power or end of Government, but only the means of carrying into effect other powers
which are sovereign. Whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers
given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union, it may be exercised by that
Government”).
See PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 74–77 (Paul Brest et al., eds., 5th ed.
2006) (“It is maintained by advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to
be considered as settled by precedent and by decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I
cannot assent.”).
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who likewise refused to carry out the order. Jackson ultimately appointed
Roger Taney, who finalized the removals.305
Jackson’s enemies in the Senate viewed these orders as patently
unconstitutional. Jackson’s unvarnished defiance of both Congress and the
judiciary, and his direct appeal to the electorate for popular legitimacy,
seemed to confirm many of his critics’ long-held suspicion that the President
was a demagogue who held the republican system in contempt. Clay warned
that the nation was “in the midst of a revolution,” in which the political
system was “rapidly advancing to a concentration of all the powers of
Government in one man,” and that under the broad Executive authority
assumed by Jackson “the powers of Congress are paralyzed, except where
they are in compliance with his own will.”306 But what came to be known as
the “Bank War” raised more specific constitutional disputes as well. First,
Jackson appeared to renege unilaterally on what had previously been settled
constitutional doctrine concerning the authority of Congress to charter a
bank. He also appeared to violate a clear congressional mandate in the
Bank’s charter concerning the security of federal deposits.307 In addition,
Jackson’s decision to remove two Secretaries of the Treasury within the space
of four months for refusing to obey a presidential order revived a debate over
the presidential removal power that had recurred periodically since 1789.308
While Article II provided a procedure for the President to appoint executive
officers, it had never specified a process for removal. Congress had
thoroughly debated the question of whether to impose strict limits on
removal in 1789, but had never settled on a final resolution, leaving the
constitutional question open to future articulation.309
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For a description of the events of the Bank War, see Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God
Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848, at 375–87 (2007); 3 David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: Democrats and Whigs 1829–1861, at 58–83 (2005); Jean Alexander
Wilbur, Biddle’s Bank: The Crucial Years (1967) (providing a history of the Bank War from the
point of view of the Bank’s supporters).
CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1833).
The federal charter directed that the government’s deposits were to be kept at the bank “unless the
Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct.” Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch.
44, 3 Stat. 266, 274 § 16. However, it also required the Secretary, in the event that he decided to
remove the deposits, to present a formal statement of “the reasons of such order or direction” to
Congress. Id. Jackson’s opponents argued that the requirement that the Secretary give reasons for
his decision to Congress impliedly granted Congress final approval over the Secretary’s decision.
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1833) (recounting speech of Sen. Henry Clay).
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 84–91
(Stephen M. Sheppard ed., 2014) (offering a brief history of the presidential removal power).
Id. at 85–86 (“President Jackson collided with Congress in 1833 when he removed the Secretary of
the Treasury for refusing to carry out his policy towards the U.S. Bank).
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Jackson’s allies controlled the House of Representatives, which removed
impeachment as a possibility. But his opponents in the Senate still hoped to
deal the President a political defeat, and more importantly to place on the
public record their objection to his expansive interpretation of Executive
power. They opted instead to vote a formal resolution censuring the
President, and declaring that “the President, in the late Executive
proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself
authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in
derogation of both.”310 Jackson immediately protested the censure as itself
unconstitutional, arguing that it constituted a procedurally improper
“impeachment” by only one house of Congress, or, in the alternative, an
impermissible bill of attainder declaring him “guilty” of violating his oath of
office.311 For Jackson, the dispute was not merely a question of personal
pride. If the legal judgment of the Senate were permitted to remain,
uncontested, on its official records, Jackson feared that he would be deemed
to have acquiesced in a highly restrictive reading of Executive power—a
reading that, in a tripartite system of constitutional interpretation, could
acquire the status of legal precedent. Thus, in the closing paragraph of his
message, the President made formal disagreement unambiguous:
To the end that the resolution of the Senate may not be hereafter drawn into
precedent,” he concluded, “with the authority of silent acquiescence on the
part of the executive department; and to the end, also, that my motives and
views in the executive proceedings denounced in that resolution may be
known to my fellow-citizens, to the world, and to all posterity, respectfully
request that this message and protest be entered at length on the Journals of
the Senate.312

The Senate, unwilling to compromise the exclusive control of their
records, or to weaken the legal force of their condemnation, determined that
Jackson’s protest of the censure, and his demand that it be printed in the
Senate Journal, constituted an invasion of legislative privilege.313 They voted
on May 6, 1834 to refuse to receive the message, and to expunge all
references to it from the Journals.314 Soon after its passage, Jackson in turn
began rallying his allies in the Senate to expunge the censure from the
Journal. The same day that the President’s message was returned, Thomas
Hart Benton of Missouri, a staunch Jacksonian, invoked the House of
Commons’ resolution banning John Wilkes—which, after fourteen years of
agitation, “was judged and condemned, for adopting a resolution which was
held by the subjects of the British Crown to be a violation of their
Constitution, and a subversion of the rights of Englishmen”— and vowed to
310
311
312
313
314

S. JOURNAL, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1834).
CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1834).
Id. at 317.
S. JOURNAL, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1834).
Id. at 248–49.
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the Senate that he would not rest until its censure was formally removed from
the Journal.315 He was ultimately successful, and the resolution was
expunged in 1837.316
The dispute over Jackson’s censure and its expurgation has perplexed
modern historians. The debates consumed a considerable amount of time,
effort, and political capital. To contemporary lawyers, the years-long fight
over the formal constitutional judgment of the Senate on Jackson’s conduct
and on the limits of Executive power appears to be little more than an
exercise in partisan combat. As one commentator has argued, the resolution
acted merely as nonbinding commentary on a controversial policy debate.
In adopting it, the Senate was “filling a well-established role—and nothing
more . . . . By approving this resolution senators simply recounted the events
as they saw them and noted their disagreement with the legality of the
President’s actions, leaving it to others—historians, the American people—
to determine Jackson’s fate, and the state of his honor.”317 As another puts
it:
The shouting match over the rights of the President and the Senate to
comment on one another’s actions . . . ended pretty much in a draw. . . .
Federal officers of all types habitually sound off on topics unrelated to their
substantive authority, and nobody tends to complain; we are wont to dismiss
the release of hot air as not rising to the level of an exercise of power. 318

But such assessments of the censure episode do not appreciate the
important role that official legislative records played in constitutional
construction until well into the nineteenth century. In the 1830s, the Senate’s
formal judgment on the legality of the President’s actions still represented a
precedential interpretation of the scope of Executive authority. This was
President Jackson’s primary reason for attacking the resolution. Jackson was
one of the most aggressive expositors of departmentalism, and his veto
message defending his decision to refuse to re-charter the bank is still
considered among the most significant expressions of that interpretative
theory.319
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears
that he will support it as he understands it,” the President argued, “and not
as it is understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges,
and on that point the President is independent of both.320
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CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1834).
S. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1837).
James C. Ho, Misunderstood Precedent: Andrew Jackson and the Real Case Against Censure, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 285 (2000).
3 CURRIE, supra note 305, at 75.
See CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 304, at 74–77.
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING, supra
note 304, at 75.
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But Jackson understood the constitutional judgments of Congress to be
of equal significance to those of the Executive.321 Jackson’s insistence that
the Senate expunge his censure was similarly framed as a demand that the
body correct an interpretative error on its record books. In his 1834 protest,
Jackson argued:
When the chief Executive Magistrate is by one of the most important
branches of the Government, in its official capacity, in a public manner, and
by its recorded sentence, but without precedent, competent authority, or just
cause, declared guilty of a breach of the laws and Constitution, it is due to
his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self-respect, that the officer
denounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been done.” 322

Jackson’s opponents in the Senate—who by the Twenty-Fourth Congress
had lost their majority—resisted the President’s call for expurgation by
arguing that such a resolution would violate the injunction of the Journal
Clause itself. This dubious argument rested on a restrictive reading of the
Clause’s text. Defenders of the censure argued that to erase it would be to
violate the requirement that the Senate “keep” a Journal of its proceedings.
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Jackson’s former Vice President and
now bitter rival, was particularly outspoken in pressing this interpretation.
Calhoun argued:
[The word keep is] of the most comprehensive meaning, and, at the same
time, free from all ambiguity . . . . It implies that our proceedings shall be
fully and accurately recorded, and, when so recorded, and, when so
recorded, that the journal containing them shall be carefully protected and
preserved . . . discharge this obligation, we are bound, not only to abstain
from destroying, altering, or in any respect injuring the journals ourselves. 323

There was little textual or historical support for this literalist reading of
the Journal Clause, but Calhoun argued that it most closely reflected the
privileged place the Journals held as official legislative records:
The impression that they are our journals and that we may do with them as
we please, is the result of a gross misconception. They indeed contain an
account of our proceedings, but they belong not to us. They are the property
of the public. They belong to the people of these confederated States; and
we have no more right to injure, alter, or destroy them, than the stranger
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Indeed, Jackson had previously objected to entries on Congress’s Journals on the grounds that they
exceeded the Congress’s authority or expressed incorrect interpretations of the Constitution. In
1831, Jackson protested the Senate’s condemnation of an allegedly “improper” nomination of a
candidate to a federal land office. See THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON 298–99 (Daniel Feller
et al., eds., 2016). Jackson ultimately resubmitted the applicant’s nomination to demonstrate his
refusal to acquiesce in the Senate’s judgment of its legality. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 22d Cong., 1st
Sess. 255 (1832). In a second incident in 1832, Jackson drafted (but did not send) a message to
Senate demanding that it expunge an entry on its Executive Journal which proposed to investigate
an agent employed by Jackson in negotiations with Native American tribes. THE PAPERS OF
ANDREW JACKSON, supra, at 28–29.
CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1834).
12 REG. DEB. 971 (1836).
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that walks the streets; no more than we have to alter or destroy the journal
of the other House, or the records of the courts of justice. 324

Jackson’s allies had not only the votes to expunge the censure, but the
stronger arguments as well. They agreed that Article I imposed a duty on
the legislature to keep faithful records but insisted that expurgation was
entirely consistent with both the history and the purpose of the Journal
Clause. In a sprawling speech recounting the history of English and
American Journals, Benton noted that both Parliament and Congress had
historically allowed the amendment or erasure of Journal entries. He cited
the ancient parliamentary practice of ordering corrections on the Journals
for the proposition “the business of rectifying mistakes or erroneous entries
in the Journals is as old as the Journals themselves.”325 He referred to the
Attainder of Strafford as well, declaring:
I have seen no instance in which the duty to keep a Journal of its proceedings
has been set up in opposition to any motion to expunge unfit matter from
the Journal; and therefore I hold it to be the settled law of Parliament that
each House has power over its own Journal, both to correct it, and to efface
objectionable matter from it.326

Benton also cited the case of Ogden’s petition as an American precedent,
noting that they were excised from the Journals because they were
“presented by the political enemies of Mr. Jefferson, and so far as they
received the support or countenance, it was from the ranks of the
Opposition.”327 The Senate’s denunciation of Jackson, like the attempt to
implicate Jefferson in a military plot, was an act of “[p]arty warfare,” and
now “the same party spirit, and the same party—the bank federal party,
which in 1806, wished to have its charges against President Jefferson
transferred from the newspapers to the Journals of Congress, thence to be
transmitted to posterity as a part of the legislative history of the country” had
condemned Jackson on the Journals as well.328
This history, Benton continued, revealed the true intent behind the
Clause’s mandate that Congress “keep” a record of its proceedings. It did
not require that either house maintain a static administrative history of its
decisions. Rather, it incorporated the ancient tradition whereby both
English and American legislatures produced and amended an evolving
account of their constitutional judgments. For Benton, who believed in the
constitutionality of Jackson’s transfer of the deposits and his removal of the
Secretary of the Treasury (twice), the presence on the Journals of a resolution
condemning the President was itself an error that required correction. “The
right to expunge,” he claimed “rests upon the right to keep the Journal clear
324
325
326
327
328

Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 189–190 (1836).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192.
Id.
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of what ought never to be upon it. It rests upon the right to purify it from
anything improper, which inadvertence, mistake, or the injustice, virulence,
and fury of party spirit may have put upon it.”329 As had happened so many
times before in the history of the Journals, the question of when and how a
legislative body could correct “errors” on its records morphed from a
secretarial one to a political and constitutional one. As a logical corollary,
Benton argued that allowing the resolution to remain on the Journals was
itself an affirmative act—by not expunging the record, the Senate was
implicitly endorsing it. The Constitution, thus, did not require the Senate to
“preserve” the record, it required the Senate to expunge the record as an
incorrect judgment on the constitutionality of a presidential act, to “correct”
it as the Cavalier Parliament had “corrected” the Attainder of Strafford.
Likewise, the purpose of these erasures was not to misrepresent the
history of legislative sittings, but to amend and revise the judgments reflected
on Congress’s records. Thus, Jackson’s censure—like Strafford’s attainder—
would not be obscured from the physical pages of the Journal books, but
circumscribed and crossed out; in other words, symbolically erased to
represent the Senate’s revision of its previous resolution. He claimed:
Nothing is suppressed, nothing so insane is intended. The whole effect, the
whole design of the motion, is to declare the solemn sense of the Senate that
such proceedings ought never to have taken place; that they were wrong
from the beginning, and require a remedy which extirpates to the root. The
order to expunge does this, and there is no other remedy which can amount
to its equivalent, or stand for its substitute.330

The purpose of the expurgation was not to erase the fact of the resolution,
but to declare that it had been wrong.
2. Petitions Against Slavery
The second example of the prominent role legislative Journals played in
constitutional construction in the 1830s is the decade-long controversy over
Congress’s receipt of citizen petitions demanding the abolition of slavery in
federal territories, including the District of Columbia. In 1831, a group of
Pennsylvania abolitionists submitted petitions to the House of
Representatives, which John Quincy Adams introduced, requesting that the
House abolish both slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia—
an act arguably within its power, as the District was under the jurisdiction of
the federal government. In the coming years, the number of petitions
demanding federal action on slavery swelled to a flood.331 Like the Senate’s
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Id. at 190.
4 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM
1829–1861, 4–6 (2005). A detailed narrative of the entire petition fight is provided by WILLIAM
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censure of President Jackson, the slavery petitions addressed a question on
which Article I was ambiguous, and which courts had consistently failed to
resolve: What precisely was the extent of Congress’s authority to regulate or
restrict slavery, particularly in federal territories?332 The legislative and
executive branches, too, had avoided the debate, preferring to compromise
rather than risk political crisis.333 The organized petition campaign was an
attempt to force the issue to a resolution through popular pressure. Also like
the Senate’s censure of Jackson, the petition campaign transformed into a
multi-year political conflict due to a dispute over a seemingly minor point of
legislative procedure. Petitions seeking the partial or total abolition of slavery
had been presented sporadically to Congress since the beginning of the
republic.334 In response, the slave states had established a fixed procedure for
suppressing any floor debate on the issue. The petitions would be received
but referred to Southern-dominated committees who would either report
adversely on them or simply refuse to report on them at all. When the most
recent wave of petitions was presented in the 1830s, this strategy was revived
and public controversy over the issue was largely contained.335 But in 1836,
Senator Calhoun and Representative John C. Hammond in the House, both
among the most prominent defenders of slaveholding interests, insisted on a
new and more radical procedural approach. Rather than simply tabling the
abolitionist petitions, Calhoun and Hammond proposed that Southern
legislators impose a rule that would prevent the Congress from receiving
them at all.336
The result was a political debacle for the South. The rule change was
never enacted in the Senate, and was implemented for a time in the House
only to be decisively repealed in 1844.337 Moreover, even if this “gag rule,”
as it came to be called, had been successful it would have done little to stem
congressional debate on slavery: The petitions were already excluded from
floor debate, while legislators were free to raise the issue themselves
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LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS (1996).
See generally Paul Finkelman, Defining Slavery Under A “Government Instituted for Protection of the Rights of
Mankind,” 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 551, 573–87 (2012).
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845,
866–67 (2011) (discussing the impact of the Missouri Compromise and its considerable concessions
for pro-slavery states); see also Paul Finkelman, Lincoln v. The Proslavery Constitution: How a Railroad
Lawyer’s Constitutional Theory Made Him the Great Emancipator, 47 ST. MARY’S L. J. 63, 71–73 (2015)
(noting the compromise made during the Constitutional Convention to suspend the application of
the Commerce Clause to the slave trade for twenty years).
Representative Caleb Cushing, whose speech is discussed infra, detailed this history on the floor of
the House. See CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 100–01 (1836).
CURRIE, supra note 331, at 4–5.
CURRIE, supra note 331, at 6.
CURRIE, supra note 331, at 21–22.
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regardless.338 And in advocating it, Calhoun alienated a key group of
moderate allies in free states. These legislators had been happy to let antislavery petitions languish in committee because they felt little support for
abolitionists, and preferred to focus their attention on more immediately
profitable legislative programs such as internal improvements.339 But the
refusal to receive abolitionist petitions appeared to infringe on the First
Amendment’s protection of citizens’ right to petition for a redress of
grievances. “If,” as James Buchanan, then a Senator from Pennsylvania,
argued, “the people have a right to command, it is the duty of their servants
to obey . . . . If the people have a right to petition their representatives, it is
our duty to receive their petition.”340 While the Congress could refuse to
debate petitions under its authority to control the rules of its own
proceedings, many congressmen believed that the Petition Clause required
each house to receive the documents in the first instance. A perceived
violation of this protection would have been widely unpopular in the early
republic, when access to the legislative process still held practical as well as
theoretical importance. Ordinary citizens relied on formal petitions to
Congress to receive critical forms of public assistance, and to promote locally
significant bills.341
Because Calhoun’s proposal would have had a minimal impact on the
slavery debates, and because it left the pro-slavery caucus weaker and more
isolated than it had been before, historians have largely treated it as a
perplexing tactical error. David Currie, in his four-volume history of
constitutional debate in Congress prior to the Civil War, calls the move
“singularly stupid,”342 and concludes:
[I]f Calhoun and his acolytes were looking for a feud, they got what they
wanted. They succeeded in making enemies of a great many people, in and
out of Congress, who had no thought of abolishing slavery in the District or
anywhere else. For they managed to turn what had been the quixotic
crusade of a despised and miniscule abolitionist minority into a broad-based
defense of the right to petition.343
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As Cushing reminded the House: “Nor do you attain anything, so far as this House is concerned;
for, by shutting out petitions you do not shut out debate; any member of the House can bring on
debate any day, by moving some general resolution applicable to the subject.” 12 REG. DEB. 2331
(1836).
4 CURRIE, supra note 331, at 6.
12 REG. DEB. 685 (1836).
See, e.g., 8 PETITION HISTORIES, supra note 226, at xi (describing the political importance of early
petitions); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739,
750–51 (1999) (describing the practice of petitioning from the first Continental Congress in 1774
to the 1830s).
4 CURRIE, supra note 331, at 6 n.28.
4 CURRIE, supra note 331, at 6.
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But, as with modern assessments of Jackson’s censure, such accounts do
not fully appreciate the constitutional importance of legislative formalities in
the era and so fail to understand Calhoun’s motives. The courts’ increasing
reluctance to intervene in the slavery debate had lent the actions of the
political branches greater constitutional significance than ever. In the
absence of an affirmative judicial resolution on Congress’s authority to limit
slavery, stakeholders expected that constitutional doctrine would be derived,
as it always had been, from the records of the official acts of the coordinate
branches.344
Calhoun was concerned about the damaging optics of allowing attacks
on slavery in floor debate, but he was more concerned about the potential
constitutional implications of permitting Congress to accept the abolitionist
petitions. Since the Middle Ages, legislatures had documented the receipt of
petitions through the process of enrollment. The nature of the petition, the
name of the petitioner, and its disposition were recorded in the Journal books
of Parliament, and later of colonial assemblies and of Congress.345
Enrollment served an administrative purpose, but it also acted as a catalogue
of legislatures’ expanding jurisdictions. Legislatures strategized to expand the
scope of their activity by accepting new classes of petitions which demanded
new forms of relief. Over time, petitions came to be used expressly for
constitutional advocacy, the Petition of Right being the preeminent example
of this phenomenon in England. Likewise, the American colonies used
petitioning to expand the scope of their autonomous political activity prior
to formal independence. In short, for a legislature to accept a petition, and
to document that acceptance on its formal records, was a political act which
had legal consequences.346
Calhoun understood this. There was little possibility that any of these
petitions would succeed in their ostensible objective of abolishing slavery or
the slave trade in the District of Columbia. But by forcing Congress to
formally receive them, the petitioners were advancing a longer-term
objective by establishing precedent for Congress to consider the question.
Even if the petitions were never debated, the legislature would have implicitly
acknowledged its authority to implement restrictions on slavery. Calhoun
was acutely sensitive to the precarious constitutional status of slavery and felt
that a determination by Congress as to whether it did or did not have the
authority to limit the institution would be critical to the South’s cause. “On
the decision, then, of the question of receiving,” Calhoun explained, in
defending the gag rule, “depends the important question of jurisdiction. To
receive is to take jurisdiction—to give an implied pledge to investigate and
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See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
See supra Part I and Sections II.A, II.B.
See supra Sections I.A, I.C, II.B.
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decide on the prayer, to give the petition a place in our archives, and become
responsible for its safe-keeping.”347
[Whoever voted for receiving, and recording, that petition] on the ground
on which its reception is placed, votes that Congress is bound to take
jurisdiction of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in the States;
gives an implied pledge to take the subject under consideration; and orders
the petition to be placed among the public records for safe-keeping.348

Calhoun—who professed his “high estimation” for the “institutions of
our English ancestors”—argued that the precedents of Parliament and
Congress established that neither house was under any obligation to receive
a petition and cited a series of instances in which the House of Commons
resolved to refuse certain classes of petitions as proof.349
The petitions’ defenders understood the larger implications of the dispute
as well. While proponents often downplayed the potential constitutional
significance of the precedent they were seeking (preferring to focus on the
less controversial issue of the petitioners’ First Amendment rights), they did
occasionally acknowledge that dispute had implications for defining the
scope of Congress’s authority to regulate slavery under Article I. Caleb
Cushing of Massachusetts, for instance, made a lengthy defense of the right
of citizens to petition the House of Representatives in which he focused
primarily on the ancient constitutional pedigree of petitioning. But Cushing
also engaged Calhoun’s jurisdictional arguments, which were being
advanced concurrently in the House by Southern congressmen. He rejected
the argument that a petition had to request relief that was clearly within
Congress’s constitutional power to provide in order to be received. He
“ask[ed] of the House how it appears that we have no right by the
Constitution to legislate upon the subject-matter of the petition? It may be
so; and it may not. One member of the House has earnestly averred that it
is; another that it is not.”350 The constitutional question had never been
clearly determined, and thus, Cushing concluded, “I cannot think it becomes
the House to decide either way, upon the mere ipse dixit of individual
members.”351
To the contrary, he insisted that abolitionist petitions should be received
precisely because the legislature’s jurisdiction to regulate slavery was so
vigorously disputed. The controversy over abolition was precipitating a
political crisis which required a constitutional resolution that, Cushing
argued, only Congress was able to provide by formally adjudicating the
matter.

347
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CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1836).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id.
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If there be any plausible reason for supposing that we have the right to
legislate on the slave interests of the District,” he warned, “you cannot put
down the investigation of the subject out of doors, by refusing to receive
petitions. On the contrary, you give the petitioners new force and efficiency,
by giving them a new cause of complaint and of excitement. 352

If, as the South protested, Congress had no right to regulate slavery, it
should employ its traditional practice of referring the matter to a committee,
receiving a “deliberate report,” and entering a resolution on its Journals
declaring as much.353 Indeed, Cushing pointed out, Congress already had
employed this method to resolve precisely the same question as early as 1790.
In that year, anti-slavery petitions had been referred to a select committee at
the urging of James Madison; the committee had rendered a report to the
Committee of the Whole House, concluding that Article I did not empower
Congress to abolish slavery; and that report was “discussed on four successive
days; . . . reported to the House with amendments, and by the House ordered
to be inscribed on its Journals, and then laid on the table.”354
Cushing’s arguments, and those like them, turned the South’s reasoning
on its head. The role of the Journals was not to exclude disputed
constitutional arguments, but rather to resolve them. As he explained of the
1791 resolution purporting to limit Article I jurisdiction over slavery:
Congress calmly and considerately examined the whole broad question, not
of the slave trade only, but also of the slave interest. It decided how far it
could go, and how far it would go. Its decision went forth to the world and
settled the questions involved in it, as it were, forever. 355

If petition opponents were so sure of their constitutional footing, they
should allow the same method of adjudication to take its course fifty years
later.356 This perspective did little to appease slavery’s defenders, as
adjudication was precisely what they were attempting to avoid. Because
precedential lawmaking was iterative, the opinions of a single Congress (or
Parliament, or court) were never permanent—they were subject to revision
and change over time, as even a cursory review of the history of legislative
Journals would confirm. While Southern legislators might have been able to
extract a resolution forbidding Congress from regulating the domestic slave
trade in 1790, as the battle over abolition intensified they felt less confident
of their ability to secure a similar resolution in 1836, let alone ten or twenty
years in the future. The safer course was to secure a rule that prevented the
issue from being adjudicated at all, however inconsistent it might be with the
underlying purpose of legislative Journal-keeping.
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As with Jackson’s censure, what modern historians have overlooked in
analyzing the petition controversy is the substantive legal importance of
legislative Journals in the early republican era. The authoritative records of
congressional proceedings elucidated the contours of the Constitution. No
less than in Stuart England, controlling the contents of those records meant,
in effect, controlling constitutional interpretation. It is true that at least in
the case of slavery, congressional attempts to resolve constitutional questions
(like judicial ones) did not avert civil war. But the importance of Journals
extended beyond a discrete set of legal issues. Journals represented an
alternative means of making and refining constitutional doctrine; a medium
of constitutional discourse that often reached issues that courts could not or
would not resolve themselves.
III. THE RISE OF LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY
Questions regarding the separation of powers, or the nature of Congress’s
constitutional obligations under Article I, did not disappear in the later
decades of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, they have persisted to
the present.357 And federal courts decline to adjudicate many of these
disputes, because they are considered to be within the exclusive purview of
the political branches. But this begs the question: why, then, did the Journals
decline in prominence in the United States after the 1830s? Why did Journalkeeping procedure not evolve and mature—as it did in seventeenth-century
England—to resolve such disputes? Many scholars have noted the difficulties
caused by the lack of a clear body of legal precedent in these areas.358 The
episodes involving Jackson’s censure and the slavery petitions provide a
glimpse of what such an evolution might have looked like. The Journals
remained—and still remain—the primary source for adjudicating disputes
over legislative procedure, which is a constitutionally important body of
precedent. But they did not expand to resolve new conflicts involving broader
questions of law.
This Part advances two related explanations for the decline of Journalkeeping as a constitutionally meaningful practice. First, as the nineteenth
century advanced, the Journals were eclipsed in prominence by a new form
of legislative recordkeeping: transcripts of debate in the House and Senate.
Prior to the nineteenth century, legislative sittings in both the United States
and Britain had been conducted in secret. The Houses of Commons and
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See, e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22 (discussing the continuing importance of constitutional norms
that exist outside the jurisdiction of Article III courts); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1103–15, 1129–
32 (2013) (discussing the continuing relevance of non-justiciable exercises of authority by the
political branches).
See infra Part IV.
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Lords met in secret from their earliest origins until the early 1800s. Nearly
every colonial legislature met in secret;359 the Continental Congress met in
secret; the Constitution was drafted in secret;360 and, while the House of
Representatives opened its doors to debate in 1789, the Senate refused to
permit observation of its debates until the year 1795.361 And even after
Congressional debates became putatively public, both houses made liberal
use of their right to invoke the “injunction of secrecy” to seal debates from
public view. Indeed, many executive sessions of the Senate remained secret
as a matter of course well into the nineteenth and even twentieth century.
Deliberations on executive nominations were only made public in 1929.362
As the franchise steadily expanded363 and communication technology
improved,364 the public began to seek more information about the positions
their elected representatives were taking on key political issues. As a result of
these converging trends, by the early nineteenth century, demands for
greater transparency in Congress could no longer be ignored. Almost
simultaneously in England and America, legislatures began not only to
permit observation of their debates, but to permit the recording and printing
of them for mass circulation. In England, Hansard began to print verbatim
accounts of parliamentary debates in 1803.365 In the United States,
newspaper accounts of House debates appeared beginning in 1789, and
accounts of Senate debates appeared beginning when that chamber lifted its
general rule of secrecy in 1795.
These reports of debates emerged, initially, to serve a political role, rather
than an institutional one. In America, legislative secrecy was a contested
issue from the first session of Congress. Republicans viewed legislative
transparency as a means of checking Federalist attempts to expand the power
of the national government. As one Republican newspaper in Philadelphia
declared in 1794, “[s]ecrecy and dissimulation are the foundations on which
despotism stands, and tyrants reign only by keeping people in ignorance.
Candor and publicity are the characteristics of free government.”366 In the
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McPherson, supra note 214, at 141.
See generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) (discussing the secrecy surrounding the Constitutional
Convention).
CUSHING, supra note 270, at 138.
See generally R. Earl McClendon, Violations of Secrecy In Re Senate Executive Sessions, 1789-1929, 51 AM.
HIST. REV. 35 (1945) (discussing the secrecy that enshrouded executive nominations prior to 1929).
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES, 32–35 (2000) (linking the expansion of the franchise to inter-party
competition for new voters and the rise of mass electioneering).
See HOWE, supra note 305, at 5 (describing America during this era as experiencing a
“communications revolution”).
See H. Donaldson Jordan, The Reporting of Parliamentary Debates, 1803–1908, 34 ECONOMICA 437
(1931); P.W. Wilson, Reporting Parliament and Congress, 214 N. AM. REV. 326, 328–29 (1921).
Untitled, PHILADELPHIA GAZETTE AND UNIVERSAL DAILY ADVERTISER (Jul. 22, 1794) (on file
with Proquest Historical Newspapers).
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1790s, legislative transparency appeared to be largely a Republican issue,
with many fearful of Federalist machinations around the First National Bank
and the assumption of Revolutionary War debts. John Beckley—a staunch
Jeffersonian when not acting in his capacity as congressional Clerk—
coauthored a pamphlet with James Monroe in 1793 in which they attacked
the bank and used the occasion to decry Senate secrecy as destructive of
democratic accountability. Monroe and Beckley wrote:
The best expedient which policy could dictate to remedy those
inconveniences resulting from the [distance between representatives and
their constituents], was by opening their doors, to subject their legislative
discussion to the free and common audience of every citizen, and to promote
the free and rapid circulation of the newspapers. But has this been done?
On the contrary, have we not seen with amazement, one branch of the
legislature, withdraw itself into a sequestered chamber, and shut its doors
upon its constituents, still guarding them with obstinate perseverance,
although more than one half the union have required that they be opened? 367

The Senate Journal records that votes on the repeated motions to open
Senate debate split mostly along party lines.368
But Republicans did not have a monopoly on pious demands for
transparency. Under Republican administrations, Federalist papers began
turning Republicans’ insistence on open legislation against them. The New
York Gazette, for instance, criticized the secrecy surrounding Congress’s
decision to declare war against Britain in 1812, writing that “whenever a
Congress shall be elected, independent and honest enough to strip the veil
from the Journals of Congress, the most shameful arts, the most paltry
intrigues, will rush forth to astonish this abused and suffering people.”369 And
indeed, while secrecy died hard in the Senate, many elected representatives
welcomed the opportunity to communicate more regularly with their
constituents through printed debates. In both England and America, the
publication of legislative speeches in print offered a means to grandstand
before mass electioneering was practical.370 The records of debate, which
began as private newspaper accounts and steadily evolved into what has
become the Congressional Record, fulfilled that purpose. Where the Journals
contained the official records of the legislature’s votes, acts, and resolutions—
its binding decisions, approved by the body as a whole—the records of
debate contained detailed transcripts of speeches given by individual
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John Beckley & James Monroe, An Examination of the Late Proceedings in Congress Respecting
the Official Conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury, in BECKLEY, supra note 267, at 50.
See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 3d Sess. 181 (1791) (motion to open debate to public defeated 17-9).
Congressional Secrecy, N.Y. GAZETTE (Aug. 14, 1813) (on file with Proquest Historical Newspapers).
See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 138–39 (Adam Przeworski, et al.,
eds., 1999) (“Indeed, within a very few years, the Senate itself was transformed from a closed council
to a highly public showplace of the rhetorical talents of the leading orators of the day.”).
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legislators. This allowed for the communication of policy positions between
elected representatives and their constituents.371
The establishment of reporting on congressional debate is arguably the
first triumph of the concept that has become known as government
transparency. It provided voters with more knowledge, and thus more
political control, over a branch of government than had ever been available
previously and represented a major advance in democratic accountability.
But the records of debate were a fundamentally different sort of document
from the Journals. The records were not law-producing documents, but
political ones. They did not represent the binding judgment of an entire
house of Congress on a question of legal precedent. Rather, they collated
the individual political positions of hundreds of legislators on countless
political issues, some of national and some of purely local concern. The first
contemporaneously published collection of congressional speeches, the
Register of Debates, was intended to collect politically engaging speeches, rather
than provide an institutional history of the Congress or its legislative activity.
As Joseph Gales and William Seaton, the Register’s publishers, explicitly stated
in their introduction to the inaugural issue, the purpose of the publication
was to supply relevant and timely political information, rather than an official
history of Congress: “the object” of the Register, they wrote, was:
to embody the Debates and striking Incidents only of the sittings of
Congress[.] [T]he possessor of this volume will be disappointed if he looks
to find in it a Journal of the two Houses of Congress. No part of their
Proceedings is given except what involves Debate, or some Incident, novel
or important in its character, and therefore worthy of preservation.372

In contrast to the strict norms of accuracy that governed Journal-keeping,
accusations of political manipulation of the debate transcripts were
commonplace, and occasionally even acknowledged by the publishers
themselves. In an era when most newspapers were openly partisan toward
either Federalist or Republican interests, which printers had access to which
debates often depended on whether the party with which they were aligned
controlled the Speakership.373 And the newspapers in which debates
appeared often doubled as both vehicles for political editorials, and as
371
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Another familiar component of congressional recordkeeping is the committee report, a
comprehensive report on a bill or an investigation produced by one of the committees of the House
of Senate. See generally Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History,
33 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209 (1958). Committee reports were produced in some form since the
earliest sessions of Congress. Id. at 215–216. But due to the informal nature of Congress’s internal
organization, they were not used frequently and their structure was not consistent. Id. at 217–18.
By the 1830s reports had become more formal and precise, id. at 227, but Congress’s use of them
was still “meager.” Id. at 228–30. It was not until the later nineteenth century that they became a
regular component of Congress’s record-making, as the scale and complexity of Congress’s
legislative activity changed considerably. Id. at 238.
1 REG. DEB. 1 (1825).
William E. Ames, A History of the “National Intelligencer” 27 (1972).
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platforms for Federalist or Republican politicians to communicate directly
with constituents.374 Joseph Gales, for instance, developed a reputation for
aiding opponents of Andrew Jackson in the records of debate.375 In short,
where the Journals were intended to record generational shifts in
constitutional norms, the records of debate were intended to provide
information about individual policy positions in as close to real time as
possible. Thomas Hart Benton made this distinction clear in an 1848 report
to the Senate, which was later cited by the Joint Committee on Printing to
justify more extensive congressional reporting. Benton argued:
[I]t would be a very narrow construction [of the Journal Clause] and a very
insufficient communication of the proceedings of Congress to the people to
confine the publication . . . to the yeas and nays and the notice of bills and
motions which appear on the journal. . . . Publicity is the soul of our
Government action. The nature of our Government, the interests of the
country, and the will of the people require publicity . . . .376

As legislators began to tailor their behavior to the new mechanisms of
accountability created by debate transcripts,377 the older tradition of
legislative adjudication of constitutional questions receded. The Journals
had allowed Congress to define and defend the prerogatives of the legislature
relative to the other branches of government. But as transparency placed
more power in the hands of voters and political parties, local and partisan
concerns came to compete with institutional ones.378
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An example of Gales manipulating congressional speeches for the benefit of Jacksonians is
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The Congressional Globe was replaced by the Congressional Record, which was printed by Congress, in
1873. See AMES, supra note 373, at 31–33. But the creation of a government-printed record left the
original, newspaper-based style of compiling transcripts virtually unchanged. Indeed, when the
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CLERK, 45TH CONG., DIGEST AND MANUAL OF THE RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE HOUSE OF
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The second explanation for the decline in use of the Journals derives from
a change in recordkeeping practices elsewhere in government. By the 1840s,
judicial review came to displace more dispersed forms of constitutional
adjudication such as departmentalism as the primary form of legal exposition
in the United States.379 As John Langbein and others have shown, changes
in recordkeeping and legal writing played a significant, yet underappreciated,
role in bringing this evolution about. As the focus of legislative recordkeeping
was moving from structured records of precedent to unstructured transcripts
of debate in the early nineteenth century, records of judicial decisions were
moving in the opposite direction. In the early republic, the concept of formal,
written judicial opinions that contributed to a body of legal precedent had
not yet taken hold.380 Judges and juries were often inclined to resolve cases
by reference to informal notions of fairness rather than to formal legal
doctrine.381
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, a group of elite jurists led
by James Kent and Justice Joseph Story, among others, embarked on a
sustained campaign to model American law and judging after European, and
particularly English, traditions. The project of producing “learned law” was
antithetical to the practice and identity of much of the early American legal
system. Because courts often considered themselves to be instruments of
popular democracy, applying communal traditions of justice rather than
formal rules, they neither relied on nor generated written precedent. While
English law had produced a large collection of legal treatises, they were
difficult for most American lawyers to access in the eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries.382 And even where these resources were available,
courts were resistant to rely on them: There was still a pervasive hostility to
the English legal profession in much of the country, as well as a democratic
resistance to the notion of professional or scientific law generally.383
In addition to ignoring English precedent, American courts generated
comparatively little of their own. Legal opinions were not written or
published, but were rather issued orally from the bench.384 And because the
primary audience for these opinions was the parties and their counsel, rather
than the bench generally or other institutions of government, early decisions
rarely employed the kind of formal reasoning rooted in precedent that is now
familiar. As a result, no indigenous body of American case law emerged from
379
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381
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For a description of the turn toward judicial supremacy in the 1830s and 1840s, and the role that
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See Langbein, supra note 380, at 571–72.

May 2019]

REDISCOVERING THE JOURNAL CLAUSE

1293

which judges could develop more sophisticated legal principles.385 The lack
of meaningful, written documentation of cases was common to every state,
and to the federal judiciary as well. In its early years, before the ascendance
of John Marshall, even the United States Supreme Court lacked an official
reporter, or a formal body of published case law.386 While oral dispositions
of state and federal cases were occasionally recorded, and broken down into
some sort of legal analysis by professional reporters looking to sell their
products to practitioners, these records were notoriously inaccurate or
incomplete.387
The professionalist movement sought to change this, by mandating that
the opinions of courts be written, printed and distributed. The Supreme
Court, spurred by Justice Story, regularized its reporting in 1816 with the
appointment of Henry Wheaton as the court’s permanent reporter.388 State
courts, led by Kent in New York, underwent a similar evolution in the first
several decades of the nineteenth century.389 The growth of accurate,
structured reporting of decisions was instrumental in creating the modern
institutional identity of judicial courts. The change enabled future courts to
rely on precedent by creating that precedent and making it widely available
for the first time. More importantly, however, by regularizing the reporting
and printing of judicial decisions—and by making clear that the purpose of
this reporting was to provide material for precedent—the professionalists
changed the way that American courts decided cases.390 Courts were forced
to record and rationalize their decisions in such a way that they could fit into
a broader universe of legal principles. Because decisions had precedential
effect, they had to be logically sound and broadly applicable in their
reasoning. They also had to consider the broader political implications of
judicial decision-making.
These changes reflect a specialization in the roles of the different
branches, which record-keeping played an integral role in bringing about.
As Kent and Story succeeded in their goal of restructuring American law
along a hierarchy of reasoned, reported opinions, the judiciary became a
more expository and analytical institution. The records that defined it were
the end product of litigation: a legal order accompanied by a mode of analysis
derived from older, published precedent. At the same time, the legislature
became less expository. The records that came to define it after the early
republican period were intended to be read by voters and partisan allies. By
encouraging the judiciary to adapt its practices and reasoning to the needs of
385
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a sophisticated precedential system, reported cases strengthened the
judiciary’s collective identity as a governmental institution. By encouraging
atomized recordkeeping and communication between legislators and their
parties and constituents, the rise of the records of debate may have had the
opposite effect.
CONCLUSION
What relevance do the Journal Clause and the history of legislative
Journal-keeping have for contemporary law? One answer is that the history
of legislative Journal-keeping, which has never before been explored in any
depth, provides valuable insight into how legislatures evolve as institutions,
and how that evolution in turn shapes the broader constitutional order. The
division of functions and powers between governmental institutions is not
static. Even in the United States, which operates under a written Constitution
that delimits the powers of the three coordinate branches, the system of
separated powers has changed considerably over time.391 The history of
Journals provides insight into a key mechanism by which this change occurs.
As the preceding sections have shown, Journal-keeping formed the basis for
legislatures’ institutional identity. Journals elucidated rules, procedures, and
privileges for members that defined how the legislature effectuated its role in
evolving democracies. They also recorded the resolution of key disputes with
other branches of government, and thereby helped to define as a matter of
law the relationship between the legislature and other institutions. Journals
demonstrate the importance of record-keeping in constitutional law,
particularly in areas where traditional judicial review is often unavailable.
The revolutionary shift between the 1780s and the 1830s from almost
total legislative secrecy to total legislative transparency remains little studied.
By the early nineteenth century, American courts were moving away from
an arbitral model of adjudication, dominated by laypeople and largely
unconcerned with formal precedent, and towards a more structured and
hierarchical model of lawmaking. During the same period, legislatures
appear to have moved in the opposite direction—restrictions on the franchise
were loosened, rules of secrecy were relaxed or abolished, and large portions
of the citizenry (often in tandem with party organizations and partisan
newspapers) began to exert an unprecedented degree of influence over the
day-to-day activity of Congress, and the behavior of its members. The
practice of using ancient precedential records to resolve disputes of
constitutional importance was gradually abandoned; the most important
legislative records were those that informed the immediate landscape of party
politics, not those that resolved institutional questions that might shape inter-
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branch relations for generations. It is difficult to determine to what extent
records caused these shifts in institutional identity, and to what extent they
were used by ideologically motivated reformers (sophisticated party
operatives, in the case of Congress; anti-populist judges like Kent and Story,
in the case of the courts) to execute a preconceived political agenda. But in
either case, these changes in recordkeeping practices normalized a
fundamental shift in how government actors perceive the boundary between
law and politics.
This development has had an important influence on how modern law
conceptualizes inter-branch relations.
A number of the structural
constitutional issues that the Journals evolved to adjudicate remain outside
the scope of judicial resolution, either because they are committed to the
legislature by the constitutional text or because they rely on norms of
governmental behavior that do not present judicially manageable
standards.392 These include consequential questions of legislative procedure
(take, for instance, the question of whether the Senate is required to hold a
vote for a President’s nomination to the Supreme Court, which was bitterly
disputed following President Obama’s unsuccessful nomination of Judge
Merrick Garland)393 and the separation of powers.394 But while Congress
remains responsible for adjudicating these issues, contemporary observers no
longer treat it as capable of resolving them through the reasoned application
of legal principles. Rather, Congress is presumed to be motivated primarily
by partisan incentives. Jeremy Waldron, for instance, has noted that there is
a “deafening” silence in legal philosophy regarding the legal principles that
govern legislative procedure; that “[t]here is nothing about legislatures or
legislation in modern philosophical jurisprudence remotely comparable to
the discussion of decision-making by judges.”395 This neglect, Waldron
suggests, derives from modern law’s assumption that “[j]udicial reasoning
poses a special problem for jurisprudence in the way that the reasoning of
legislators does not,” because “[t]he processes by which courts reach their
decisions . . . are supposed to be special and distinctive, not directly political,
but interpretative of already established political conclusions or expressive of
some underlying spirit of legality.”396 Argument in legislatures, by contrast,
is “explicitly and unashamedly political,” reflecting “either the interplay of
interests, or the direct clash of policy proposals and ideologies.”397 The
392
393

394
395
396
397

See supra note 21.
See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131
HARV. L. REV. 96, 106–10 (2017) (describing the constitutional debate over Garland’s nomination
and explaining the role of historical precedent in analyzing this dispute).
See, e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 9, 34–39 (describing the role of non-judicially enforceable
norms in structuring the separation of powers).
Waldron, supra note 24, at 644.
Waldron, supra note 24, at 644.
Waldron, supra note 24, at 644.

1296

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:5

constitutional “law” governing the relationship between the political
branches has received similar treatment. Some commentators have
suggested that constitutional scholars should analyze questions about the
limitations and distribution of power in American democracy not at the level
of formal governmental institutions, but at the level of political interest
groups. These are the parties who compete to capture and control
governmental institutions, and who compete for real political power.398 For
instance, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes observe that the “Madisonian
conception of separation of powers”—in which the “ambition” of competing
institutions with different constitutional prerogatives is intended to prevent
the consolidation of power in any single department of government—was
preempted shortly after the ratification of the Constitution by partisan
politics.399 Ideological competition “between the legislative and executive
branches” was “displaced by competition between two major parties,” and
as result the “machine” that was supposed to promote stable institutional
norms and an equitable distribution of power “stopped running.”400
This shift from institutional to political reasoning as the definitive
dynamic in structural constitutionalism has caused alarm, particularly as
political polarization has increased in recent decades. Observers have
worried that the partisan commitments of legislative and executive officials
will so outweigh their institutional commitments, that they will be willing to
undermine longstanding norms of legislative procedure or inter-branch
comity in order to score short-term victories.401 This dynamic, the argument
goes, threatens to permanently subordinate second-order commitments to
the republican process to first-order policy goals, leading to entrenched
dysfunction.402 Interpretations of constitutional rules are motivated less by
fidelity to the principle of separated powers, and more by the maximalist
commitment to political victory.403 Brinksmanship animated by sharply
divergent views of the relative powers of the political branches becomes more
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common,404 and political actors become increasingly willing to accuse their
opponents of “bad faith” interpretations of constitutional commitments.405
In the extreme, these showdowns may lead to “constitutional crises” in which
disputes over legal authority are resolved not by reasoned discourse, but by
the use of force.406
But while there is a vast literature that describes—and laments—the
politicization of structural constitutionalism, there have been surprisingly few
attempts to locate the ultimate causes of this dysfunction. Scholarship
generally assumes that partisan rather than institutional competition is the
operative dynamic within the political branches; it rarely questions whether
this development was inevitable. The history of the Journal Clause
demonstrates that within the Legislative Branch deliberate choices were
made in the development of recordkeeping practices that ultimately rendered
Congress more responsive to partisan concerns than to institutional ones.
Two models of legislative recordkeeping existed at the beginning of the early
Republic: one (the Journals) was based on precedential lawmaking, and
focused on adjudicating the competing prerogatives of constitutional actors;
the other (the records of debate) was rooted in politics, and focused on
holding legislators accountable to their constituents and party. By the middle
of the nineteenth century, the former model, despite playing a critical role in
constitutional law for centuries, had faded into obscurity, while the latter had
become a powerful force in shaping legislative behavior. This change was a
crucial but now largely forgotten factor in facilitating the displacement of
institutional concerns within the Legislative Branch with partisan ones.
Thus, if the “law” of legislative procedure or the “law” of inter-branch
relations seems to modern observers to be uniquely unreasoned—uniquely
subject to the vicissitudes of partisanship—that is in part because the
legislature was incentivized by its own record-making regime to
conceptualize legal disputes in that way. Records are accountability
mechanisms. They provide a narrative of what the record-keeper does and
why. As scholars have observed in the context of administrative law, a society
shapes the institutions it is governed by in part by determining the type of
records those institutions keep (i.e., the categories of information those
records contain) and the audience toward whom those records are addressed
(i.e., the interest groups to whom the institution is to be held accountable).407
To the extent that earlier generations of legislators opted to emphasize a
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uniquely political form of recordkeeping in their legislative practice, it is not
surprising that the result was an institution that often reasons and behaves in
an explicitly political way. But this choice has unnecessarily limited modern
lawyers’ ability to conceptualize alternative models of legislative reasoning.
Waldron has observed that legislatures lack “an ideal type or theoretical
model that would do for our understanding of legislation what, for example,”
Ronald Dworkin’s idealized judge, Hercules, “purports to do for adjudicative
reasoning.”408 This disparity may derive in part from the fact that courts
have spent the last two centuries developing and refining models of formal
dispute resolution, thanks to the project of learned law.409 If a judge such as
Hercules wanted to develop an idealized model of adjudication, he would
have ample source material to work with. If, by contrast, a hypothetical
legislature were to attempt a similar project—improving its rules of
procedure, and developing formal mechanisms whereby disputes over
constitutional requirements could be definitively settled through the
application of legal reasoning—it would have to start mostly from scratch,
because the system of recordkeeping that could have formed the basis for
such an endeavor was abandoned generations ago.
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